Earlier this year, Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) and 3G Capital put togehter a large deal for what is now Kraft Heinz (KHC). Warren Buffett, after making some specific comments back in August about Kraft Heinz on CNBC, offered a more generalized view of larger food company market valuations.
He said that "most of the food companies sell at prices that it would be very hard for us to make a deal..."
This at least suggests future stock returns might be a whole lot less attractive if the existing price environment persists. In fact, those who likes one or more of these businesses as an investment for the longer haul (i.e. not as a speculative trade) should prefer that their shares underperform in the coming years.*
So, even if these businesses do perform reasonably well, equity return expectations should be tempered due to the fact that market prices aren't, in general, selling at a discount to per share intrinsic value.
(In fact, some to me now appear to be selling at a premium to value.)
The equity valuation environment was entirely a different one several years ago. Some of the consumer packaged goods makers remain terrific businesses in my view but, no matter how high quality something is, price matters.
Even the very best of these types of businesses certainly have not risen, on a per share basis, intrinsically in value as much as their stock prices have risen in recent years.
(Though some were selling at a nice discount to value back then so some of the gains since that time can be partly explained by having closed -- or more than closed -- that gap.)
It's when fear begins to dominate the psychology of markets that usually spells opportunity. Even very good businesses are far from immune to negative market price action.
That is -- or, at least, should be viewed as -- the good news.
"Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that 'Price is what you pay; value is what you get.' Whether we're talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down." - Warren Buffett in his 1992 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter
Attractive prices rarely come along when the outlook is rosy. Most of the time -- short of a broad-based market decline -- there will be real and/or perceived legitimate questions about future prospects.**
A temporary, or even extended, drop in price can prove beneficial for investors.
A permanent drop in value is not.
High quality businesses tend to have durable advantages that allow intrinsic values to be persistent even in challenging economic environments while generally increasing -- even if unevenly -- over the longer haul.
Attempting to judge how intrinsic values might change and whether the price paid offers sufficient margin of safety ought to take priority over attempting to guess where prices are going near-term (or even intermediate-term).
Will these businesses still be able to deliver the kind of results they've been producing for a very long time?
A more challenging future doesn't necessarily mean the best of these have become -- or will become -- subpar businesses, but questions like this (and many others) still need to be carefully considered.
The world they're competing in is, as it likely always will be, changing in ways that might alter what have in the past been attractive core business economics.
Adam
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent market prices. No position in KHC.
* To not only allow for the purchase/accumulation of more shares, but also so buybacks and dividend reinvestments are more effective. Some might wonder why Buffett wouldn't just sell now that market prices more fully reflect value. Well, he's made it clear they're in it for the long haul -- they're in it for what the business will be able to produce over a very long time horizon. So, in other words, he's likely satisfied with the price he paid against current value and the value that will be created over time. That doesn't mean current market prices make much sense.
** Few businesses, if any, are immune to difficulties from time to time. Part of investing well is learning how to differentiate the temporary but fixable setbacks from those that are more fundamental and value destroying in a permanent way.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, October 27, 2015
Monday, October 12, 2015
Activists & the AmEx Buyback, Part II
A follow up to this post. Last month news broke that an activist hedge fund, ValueAct Capital Management, had taken a stake in American Express (AXP).
Well, not long after the ValueAct stake was announced, Warren Buffett had the following to say about buybacks and AmEx in an interview on CNBC:*
"People assume when we buy some stock we want it to go up. We don't want it to go up. Maybe, obviously, eventually... five or ten years from now [we'd like it]."
He added "we love the idea" of a business with an already cheap stock "buying its stock cheaper. I mean that's happened at American Express", and since they're "a regular repurchaser of shares", Berkshire Hathaway's (BRKa) stake increases more quickly "if the stock is down than if the stock is up."
Buffett was then asked whether he likes to see an activist like ValueAct come into the picture with AmEx.
Buffett's response was "No not particularly but...it is up to them what they do with their money. Actually it [sent the stock up] four or five points so the extent that American Express is repurchasing shares" it actually hurts AmEx long-term shareholders. He also said that "the cheaper the stock is the more shares American Express will be able to repurchase for a given amount of money and on balance...that helps us."
Each dollar used to buyback shares will have a smaller impact on share count. Plainly not a good thing for the long-term owner.
Fortunately the stock has come back down somewhat since Buffett said the above -- in part due to some of the market turmoil -- but, then again, maybe it would be down even more if there was no activist involvement.
The problem here is not at all specific to ValueAct. As I wrote in the prior post:
Naturally, this doesn't mean ValueAct won't ultimately end up having a positive effect [on AmEx].
They just may.
It's just that whatever effect on the business they end up having, it will potentially have to offset the negative impact -- at least from the standpoint of a long-term investor in AmEx -- of the higher prices making the buyback activity less effective (if the higher stock price proves persistent and is directly related to the hope an activist will eventually have a favorable influence).
Now, whether or not AmEx must adapt more effectively to a changing competitive and technological landscape is an important and fair debate. If an investor comes along -- one who's in it for the long haul -- can contribute to such a debate that certainly wouldn't be the worst thing that could happen.
More from last week's interview with Buffett:
"...People make buybacks very complicated. [A buyback] makes sense when you are buying your stock back below its intrinsic value and when you don't need that money for the needs of the business. And it makes no sense when you pay above intrinsic value and that's a very simple principle but it has been ignored by many managements over time."
I know it might seem odd to think of a stock rallying as bad news but, if a good business with some extra cash is buying back shares that sell nicely below per share intrinsic value, that's simply how the math works -- especially in the long run. Depending on for how long, and by how much, the stock remains below intrinsic the effect on future per share intrinsic value can be anywhere from negligible to quite substantial.
The reality is it makes little sense, no matter how counterintuitive, to hope shares of a good business rally in the near-term when the plan is to be an owner for decades. Of course, this won't work if the enterprise proves fundamentally flawed in some way. Otherwise, for those in a position to consistently buyback shares over time any near-term (or even intermediate-term) rally will only reduce returns. In other words, a stock that sells persistently below what it's intrinsically worth can increase investor returns, all else equal, at less risk.**
Naturally, for those who plan to sell next week it's a very different story.
During the interview Buffett points out that he can't buy more shares of AmEx.
The reason?
AmEx is a bank holding company and Berkshire already owns as much as is allowed.
Adam
Long position in AXP and BRKb established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
Activists & the AmEx Buyback, Part I
Altria: Price Matters
Multiple Expansion, Buybacks, & The P/E Illusion
The P/E Illusion
The Benefits of a Declining Stock
Buffett's Purchase of IBM Revisited
Buffett on Buybacks, Book Value, and Intrinsic Value
Buffett on Teledyne's Henry Singleton
Why Buffett Wants IBM's Shares "To Languish"
Buffett: When it's Advisable for a Company to Repurchase Shares
The Best Use of Corporate Cash
Buffett on Stock Buybacks - Part II
Buffett on Stock Buybacks
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?
* These quotes, in some cases, differ very slightly from CNBC's unofficial transcript.
** This can, depending on the circumstances, also work for dividend reinvestments.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
"People assume when we buy some stock we want it to go up. We don't want it to go up. Maybe, obviously, eventually... five or ten years from now [we'd like it]."
He added "we love the idea" of a business with an already cheap stock "buying its stock cheaper. I mean that's happened at American Express", and since they're "a regular repurchaser of shares", Berkshire Hathaway's (BRKa) stake increases more quickly "if the stock is down than if the stock is up."
Buffett was then asked whether he likes to see an activist like ValueAct come into the picture with AmEx.
Buffett's response was "No not particularly but...it is up to them what they do with their money. Actually it [sent the stock up] four or five points so the extent that American Express is repurchasing shares" it actually hurts AmEx long-term shareholders. He also said that "the cheaper the stock is the more shares American Express will be able to repurchase for a given amount of money and on balance...that helps us."
Each dollar used to buyback shares will have a smaller impact on share count. Plainly not a good thing for the long-term owner.
Fortunately the stock has come back down somewhat since Buffett said the above -- in part due to some of the market turmoil -- but, then again, maybe it would be down even more if there was no activist involvement.
The problem here is not at all specific to ValueAct. As I wrote in the prior post:
Naturally, this doesn't mean ValueAct won't ultimately end up having a positive effect [on AmEx].
They just may.
It's just that whatever effect on the business they end up having, it will potentially have to offset the negative impact -- at least from the standpoint of a long-term investor in AmEx -- of the higher prices making the buyback activity less effective (if the higher stock price proves persistent and is directly related to the hope an activist will eventually have a favorable influence).
Now, whether or not AmEx must adapt more effectively to a changing competitive and technological landscape is an important and fair debate. If an investor comes along -- one who's in it for the long haul -- can contribute to such a debate that certainly wouldn't be the worst thing that could happen.
More from last week's interview with Buffett:
"...People make buybacks very complicated. [A buyback] makes sense when you are buying your stock back below its intrinsic value and when you don't need that money for the needs of the business. And it makes no sense when you pay above intrinsic value and that's a very simple principle but it has been ignored by many managements over time."
I know it might seem odd to think of a stock rallying as bad news but, if a good business with some extra cash is buying back shares that sell nicely below per share intrinsic value, that's simply how the math works -- especially in the long run. Depending on for how long, and by how much, the stock remains below intrinsic the effect on future per share intrinsic value can be anywhere from negligible to quite substantial.
The reality is it makes little sense, no matter how counterintuitive, to hope shares of a good business rally in the near-term when the plan is to be an owner for decades. Of course, this won't work if the enterprise proves fundamentally flawed in some way. Otherwise, for those in a position to consistently buyback shares over time any near-term (or even intermediate-term) rally will only reduce returns. In other words, a stock that sells persistently below what it's intrinsically worth can increase investor returns, all else equal, at less risk.**
Naturally, for those who plan to sell next week it's a very different story.
During the interview Buffett points out that he can't buy more shares of AmEx.
The reason?
AmEx is a bank holding company and Berkshire already owns as much as is allowed.
Adam
Long position in AXP and BRKb established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
Activists & the AmEx Buyback, Part I
Altria: Price Matters
Multiple Expansion, Buybacks, & The P/E Illusion
The P/E Illusion
The Benefits of a Declining Stock
Buffett's Purchase of IBM Revisited
Buffett on Buybacks, Book Value, and Intrinsic Value
Buffett on Teledyne's Henry Singleton
Why Buffett Wants IBM's Shares "To Languish"
Buffett: When it's Advisable for a Company to Repurchase Shares
The Best Use of Corporate Cash
Buffett on Stock Buybacks - Part II
Buffett on Stock Buybacks
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?
* These quotes, in some cases, differ very slightly from CNBC's unofficial transcript.
** This can, depending on the circumstances, also work for dividend reinvestments.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Monday, September 28, 2015
Behavioral Biases: How They Influence Investment Decisions
When a stock performs well -- and as just one example Amazon's (AMZN) stock, to say the least, certainly has over the long haul -- it's easy to become convinced, at times incorrectly, what ended up happening was obvious all along.
That's hindsight bias -- the belief, after the fact, that something was more predictable than it actually was -- and is just one among the many biases that impact investor behavior and results (and generally not in a good way).
Now, here's just some examples of those who, more or less, previously expressed a favorable view of Amazon as an investment.*
- Amazon 'Undervalued': Portfolio Manager
- Analysts Bullish on Amazon
- Ken Fisher Still Bullish on Amazon
And some from those with a less favorable point of view...
- Not Even Jeff Bezos Would Buy Amazon's Cash Flow
- Three Reasons Why Amazon's Cash Flow Is No Comfort
- Don't Be Fooled by Amazon's Cash Flow
There are, of course, many more examples of thoughtful but opposing views to be found. The same stock but very different views. For those with an open mind this can and should be a good thing. Unfortunately, it's easy to make the mistake of only seeking information that's consistent with one's own thinking.
Of course, investment decisions should never be based upon what someone else thinks. Ultimately, each investor needs to come to his/her own conclusions. Yet it's important to avoid making the mistake of only giving consideration to information that reinforces a particular view -- however flawed or biased it might be -- while mostly ignoring contrary facts and logic.
Keep in mind I'm simply using Amazon as an example. The same thing, in general, can be applied to other stocks though naturally the specific circumstances will always be unique.
Personally, I respect and admire Amazon and Jeff Bezos** but have never considered owning the stock for a simple reason:
I just don't know how to value it within a narrow enough range.
That doesn't necessarily mean I'll be surprised if the company proves to be very valuable over the long run.
In fact I won't be at all.
It simply means I don't understand it well enough especially when compared to alternatives; it means my estimate (within a range) of likely future returns can't be compared in a meaningful way to those things I think I do understand better; it means that if I can't value something with enough warranted confidence, it's by definition impossible to determine what price represents a sufficient margin of safety.
So, as a result, it has never made any sense for me to consider owning Amazon's stock. Behaving otherwise would likely be, at least in my case, a recipe for subpar results or worse in the long run.
Now, lets assume for some reason I had long ago decided to buy Amazon (again, I've always had -- and continue to have -- zero interest in doing so) and it happened to work out well for me. This result would have been mostly, if not entirely, due to pure luck. In other words, not being able recognize when good fortune more so than being right was the reason for the good result will likely lead to future costly mistakes and reduced results.
(Even though, due to luck, the results were favorably impacted by the Amazon investment my view is that the lack of discipline, ultimately, is likely to hurt results.)
It's about knowing and staying within limits.
Those who buy any stock without carefully considering the reasons why things may not go as well as hoped are potentially setting themselves up for permanent capital loss.
Beware of confirmation bias.
Beware of investor overconfidence.
These can prove expensive in the long run.
If not carefully managed these and other biases can lead to big and unnecessary mistakes.
The important thing to remember is that biases are -- in the context of investing -- not just someone else's problem.
For most of us -- if not all of us -- bias blind spot is a real factor.
It's easy to point to what worked well with the benefit of hindsight. For every Amazon -- at least in the real world -- there will be many that seem to have great potential but don't work out nearly so well.
That simply won't be obvious before the fact.
It will only become obvious when looking through the rear-view mirror.
Knowing what to avoid starts with buying only what you understand.
That means, inevitably, sometimes it's necessary to "miss" what after the fact proves to be an excellent opportunity.
Some investors no doubt were able to see Amazon's potential long ago and were rewarded for it.
Still, it's important to try and be objective about the reason something worked out well.
Easier said than done.
Sometimes, an investment might work out well due to brilliant insight and foresight.
Other times, good fortune might have played a significant role.
Knowing the difference can eliminate errors down the road.
Maybe some think Amazon's prospects and intrinsic business value have always been, and remain, plain to see; or maybe that's, at least in part, simply hindsight bias at work.
Adam
No position in AMZN
* Naturally, views such as these are not necessarily static, may have changed, or at some point may change.
** Some concerns and criticisms have also been previously highlighted.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
That's hindsight bias -- the belief, after the fact, that something was more predictable than it actually was -- and is just one among the many biases that impact investor behavior and results (and generally not in a good way).
Now, here's just some examples of those who, more or less, previously expressed a favorable view of Amazon as an investment.*
- Amazon 'Undervalued': Portfolio Manager
- Analysts Bullish on Amazon
- Ken Fisher Still Bullish on Amazon
And some from those with a less favorable point of view...
- Not Even Jeff Bezos Would Buy Amazon's Cash Flow
- Three Reasons Why Amazon's Cash Flow Is No Comfort
- Don't Be Fooled by Amazon's Cash Flow
There are, of course, many more examples of thoughtful but opposing views to be found. The same stock but very different views. For those with an open mind this can and should be a good thing. Unfortunately, it's easy to make the mistake of only seeking information that's consistent with one's own thinking.
Of course, investment decisions should never be based upon what someone else thinks. Ultimately, each investor needs to come to his/her own conclusions. Yet it's important to avoid making the mistake of only giving consideration to information that reinforces a particular view -- however flawed or biased it might be -- while mostly ignoring contrary facts and logic.
Keep in mind I'm simply using Amazon as an example. The same thing, in general, can be applied to other stocks though naturally the specific circumstances will always be unique.
Personally, I respect and admire Amazon and Jeff Bezos** but have never considered owning the stock for a simple reason:
I just don't know how to value it within a narrow enough range.
That doesn't necessarily mean I'll be surprised if the company proves to be very valuable over the long run.
In fact I won't be at all.
It simply means I don't understand it well enough especially when compared to alternatives; it means my estimate (within a range) of likely future returns can't be compared in a meaningful way to those things I think I do understand better; it means that if I can't value something with enough warranted confidence, it's by definition impossible to determine what price represents a sufficient margin of safety.
So, as a result, it has never made any sense for me to consider owning Amazon's stock. Behaving otherwise would likely be, at least in my case, a recipe for subpar results or worse in the long run.
Now, lets assume for some reason I had long ago decided to buy Amazon (again, I've always had -- and continue to have -- zero interest in doing so) and it happened to work out well for me. This result would have been mostly, if not entirely, due to pure luck. In other words, not being able recognize when good fortune more so than being right was the reason for the good result will likely lead to future costly mistakes and reduced results.
(Even though, due to luck, the results were favorably impacted by the Amazon investment my view is that the lack of discipline, ultimately, is likely to hurt results.)
It's about knowing and staying within limits.
Those who buy any stock without carefully considering the reasons why things may not go as well as hoped are potentially setting themselves up for permanent capital loss.
Beware of confirmation bias.
Beware of investor overconfidence.
These can prove expensive in the long run.
If not carefully managed these and other biases can lead to big and unnecessary mistakes.
The important thing to remember is that biases are -- in the context of investing -- not just someone else's problem.
For most of us -- if not all of us -- bias blind spot is a real factor.
It's easy to point to what worked well with the benefit of hindsight. For every Amazon -- at least in the real world -- there will be many that seem to have great potential but don't work out nearly so well.
That simply won't be obvious before the fact.
It will only become obvious when looking through the rear-view mirror.
Knowing what to avoid starts with buying only what you understand.
That means, inevitably, sometimes it's necessary to "miss" what after the fact proves to be an excellent opportunity.
Some investors no doubt were able to see Amazon's potential long ago and were rewarded for it.
Still, it's important to try and be objective about the reason something worked out well.
Easier said than done.
Sometimes, an investment might work out well due to brilliant insight and foresight.
Other times, good fortune might have played a significant role.
Knowing the difference can eliminate errors down the road.
Maybe some think Amazon's prospects and intrinsic business value have always been, and remain, plain to see; or maybe that's, at least in part, simply hindsight bias at work.
Adam
No position in AMZN
* Naturally, views such as these are not necessarily static, may have changed, or at some point may change.
** Some concerns and criticisms have also been previously highlighted.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
Bogle on Speculation
John "Jack" Bogle recently said the following on CNBC about volatility in the capital markets:
"It's just speculators not speculating on what they think is going to happen but what they think other speculators think is going to happen..."
So it's too much focus on trying to guess how other market participants might behave, along with other near-term events (fed action or inaction, earnings reports, GDP growth), instead of gauging the intrinsic values of businesses.
"This speculative binge that we're seeing here … has nothing to do with the fundamentals behind the long-term value of equities in particular, which are created by the values of corporations, earnings and dividends, and reinvestment in the business."
Estimating intrinsic business values is challenging enough; guessing what the market -- or any individual security -- is going to do is if not impossible, for most of us at least, a fool's game.
The idea that since a little speculation in markets is a good thing then unlimited amounts must become a wonderful thing is a fallacy. The petrol engine in my car likes roughly the right amount of air relative to fuel in order for the combustion process to work. So that means, at some point, too much -- or too little -- air compared to fuel will actually hinder performance.
It's about optimization. The same is true for capital markets. I'd argue there's way too much activity geared toward what's going to happen in the next minute, hour, day, week, month -- and even a year or two. Too much air; not enough fuel.
All of those time frames are way too short to be considered investment activity. It's speculation and even pure gambling (there's a difference between the two) over investment.
There are important reasons for the capital markets to exist and the focus should be mostly on what's the optimal way to makes sure it serves the real economy instead of itself.
Adam
Related posts:
Zero-Sum Games
On Speculation and Investment
Bogle on the Financial System
Graham on Investment: "Most Intelligent When It Is Most Businesslike"
John Bogle on Speculation & Capitalism's "Pathological Mutation"
Bogle: Back to the Basics - Speculation Dwarfing Investment
Buffett on Gambling and Speculation
Buffett on Speculation and Investment - Part II
Buffett on Speculation and Investment - Part I
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
"It's just speculators not speculating on what they think is going to happen but what they think other speculators think is going to happen..."
So it's too much focus on trying to guess how other market participants might behave, along with other near-term events (fed action or inaction, earnings reports, GDP growth), instead of gauging the intrinsic values of businesses.
"This speculative binge that we're seeing here … has nothing to do with the fundamentals behind the long-term value of equities in particular, which are created by the values of corporations, earnings and dividends, and reinvestment in the business."
Estimating intrinsic business values is challenging enough; guessing what the market -- or any individual security -- is going to do is if not impossible, for most of us at least, a fool's game.
The idea that since a little speculation in markets is a good thing then unlimited amounts must become a wonderful thing is a fallacy. The petrol engine in my car likes roughly the right amount of air relative to fuel in order for the combustion process to work. So that means, at some point, too much -- or too little -- air compared to fuel will actually hinder performance.
It's about optimization. The same is true for capital markets. I'd argue there's way too much activity geared toward what's going to happen in the next minute, hour, day, week, month -- and even a year or two. Too much air; not enough fuel.
All of those time frames are way too short to be considered investment activity. It's speculation and even pure gambling (there's a difference between the two) over investment.
There are important reasons for the capital markets to exist and the focus should be mostly on what's the optimal way to makes sure it serves the real economy instead of itself.
Adam
Related posts:
Zero-Sum Games
On Speculation and Investment
Bogle on the Financial System
Graham on Investment: "Most Intelligent When It Is Most Businesslike"
John Bogle on Speculation & Capitalism's "Pathological Mutation"
Bogle: Back to the Basics - Speculation Dwarfing Investment
Buffett on Gambling and Speculation
Buffett on Speculation and Investment - Part II
Buffett on Speculation and Investment - Part I
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Friday, September 4, 2015
Buffett on Value vs Growth
Warren Buffett, in an interview on CNBC back in March of this year, said the following:
"I always say if you aren't investing for value, what are you investing for? And the idea that value and growth are two different things makes no sense. I mean, growth is part of the value equation and a company that grows and uses little capital in doing it...is obviously worth more money than one that doesn't grow. That doesn't make the one that doesn't grow valueless though." - Warren Buffett on CNBC
Growth can be a good thing if the price is right (i.e. price paid comfortably less than est. per share intrinsic value). Unfortunately, exciting growth prospects sometimes attracts more than its fair share of attention leading to market prices more than reflecting intrinsic value.
Too little margin of safety if future business performance disappoints.
In fact, growth isn't necessarily even always a good thing:
"Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive." - Warren Buffett in the 1992 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) Shareholder Letter
Some seem to treat all growth as good growth. Well, that's just not the case.
"...business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth." - Warren Buffett in the 1992 Berkshire Letter
What matters is buying a good business -- whether it happens to have growth prospects or not -- at a discount and warranted confidence that the core business economics are attractive and will remain so.
Some businesses produce high returns on existing capital but can't do the same on incremental capital. These can still prove to be sound investments (again, at the right price) but growth prospects -- at least the kind of growth that produces satisfactory or better returns -- will usually be modest. The fact is putting incremental capital to work in such a business can actually end up hurting investors. So excess capital needs to be intelligently allocated elsewhere* (outside the business) or, otherwise, returned to shareholders.
One problem that sometimes arises with higher growth businesses is simply that investors pay too much for the privilege of ownership. In other words, due to the excitement about the upside potential, what could go wrong doesn't get fair consideration. The end result being investors pay a price that doesn't protect them sufficiently if things don't go quite as well as hoped.
A price biased toward things going well can increase the risk of permanent capital loss. In fact, an optimistic price might lead to insufficient rewards even if things do go well.
More risk.
Less reward.
Adam
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
High Returns on Capital vs High Returns on Incremental Capital - Jan 2015
Altria: Timing Isn't Everything, Part II - Jul 2014
Aesop's Investment Axiom Revisited - Jul 2014
Altria: Timing Isn't Everything - Jul 2014
Asset Growth and Stock Returns, Part II - Mar 2014
Asset Growth and Stock Returns - Feb 2014
Buffett and Munger on See's Candies, Part II - Jun 2013
Buffett and Munger on See's Candies - Jun 2013
Aesop's Investment Axiom - Feb 2013
Grantham: Investing in a Low-Growth World - Feb 2013
Buffett: Stocks, Bonds, and Coupons - Jan 2013
Maximizing Per-Share Value - Oct 2012
Death of Equities Greatly Exaggerated - Aug 2012
Stock Returns & GDP Growth - Jul 2012
Why Growth May Matter Less Than Investors Think - Jul 2012
Ben Graham: Better Than Average Expected Growth - Mar 2012
Buffett: Why Growth Is Not Necessarily A Good Thing - Oct 2011
Technology Stocks - May 2011
Grantham: High Growth Doesn't Equal High Returns - Nov 2010
Growth & Investor Returns - Jun 2010
Buffett on "The Prototype Of A Dream Business" - Sep 2009
High Growth Doesn't Equal High Investor Returns - Jul 2009
The Growth Myth Revisited - Jul 2009
The Growth Myth - Jun 2009
* Berkshire has the luxury of being able to move excess capital from where it can't produce high returns to where it can.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
"I always say if you aren't investing for value, what are you investing for? And the idea that value and growth are two different things makes no sense. I mean, growth is part of the value equation and a company that grows and uses little capital in doing it...is obviously worth more money than one that doesn't grow. That doesn't make the one that doesn't grow valueless though." - Warren Buffett on CNBC
Growth can be a good thing if the price is right (i.e. price paid comfortably less than est. per share intrinsic value). Unfortunately, exciting growth prospects sometimes attracts more than its fair share of attention leading to market prices more than reflecting intrinsic value.
Too little margin of safety if future business performance disappoints.
In fact, growth isn't necessarily even always a good thing:
"Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive." - Warren Buffett in the 1992 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) Shareholder Letter
Some seem to treat all growth as good growth. Well, that's just not the case.
"...business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth." - Warren Buffett in the 1992 Berkshire Letter
What matters is buying a good business -- whether it happens to have growth prospects or not -- at a discount and warranted confidence that the core business economics are attractive and will remain so.
Some businesses produce high returns on existing capital but can't do the same on incremental capital. These can still prove to be sound investments (again, at the right price) but growth prospects -- at least the kind of growth that produces satisfactory or better returns -- will usually be modest. The fact is putting incremental capital to work in such a business can actually end up hurting investors. So excess capital needs to be intelligently allocated elsewhere* (outside the business) or, otherwise, returned to shareholders.
One problem that sometimes arises with higher growth businesses is simply that investors pay too much for the privilege of ownership. In other words, due to the excitement about the upside potential, what could go wrong doesn't get fair consideration. The end result being investors pay a price that doesn't protect them sufficiently if things don't go quite as well as hoped.
A price biased toward things going well can increase the risk of permanent capital loss. In fact, an optimistic price might lead to insufficient rewards even if things do go well.
More risk.
Less reward.
Adam
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
High Returns on Capital vs High Returns on Incremental Capital - Jan 2015
Altria: Timing Isn't Everything, Part II - Jul 2014
Aesop's Investment Axiom Revisited - Jul 2014
Altria: Timing Isn't Everything - Jul 2014
Asset Growth and Stock Returns, Part II - Mar 2014
Asset Growth and Stock Returns - Feb 2014
Buffett and Munger on See's Candies, Part II - Jun 2013
Buffett and Munger on See's Candies - Jun 2013
Aesop's Investment Axiom - Feb 2013
Grantham: Investing in a Low-Growth World - Feb 2013
Buffett: Stocks, Bonds, and Coupons - Jan 2013
Maximizing Per-Share Value - Oct 2012
Death of Equities Greatly Exaggerated - Aug 2012
Stock Returns & GDP Growth - Jul 2012
Why Growth May Matter Less Than Investors Think - Jul 2012
Ben Graham: Better Than Average Expected Growth - Mar 2012
Buffett: Why Growth Is Not Necessarily A Good Thing - Oct 2011
Technology Stocks - May 2011
Grantham: High Growth Doesn't Equal High Returns - Nov 2010
Growth & Investor Returns - Jun 2010
Buffett on "The Prototype Of A Dream Business" - Sep 2009
High Growth Doesn't Equal High Investor Returns - Jul 2009
The Growth Myth Revisited - Jul 2009
The Growth Myth - Jun 2009
* Berkshire has the luxury of being able to move excess capital from where it can't produce high returns to where it can.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Competition & Moats
At the 2014 Daily Journal (DJCO) shareholder meeting Charlie Munger said:*
How many big companies stay totally on top forever? Maybe Wrigley's Gum.
Then later added...
It's a competitive world out there. Somebody is always starting something. Even for the branded goods makers, who looked so invincible for forty years. The natural course of competition is that it gets tough. It's the people who expect everything to just keep going wonderfully who are nuts.
So at least some of these businesses are not quite as bulletproof as they used to be. Part of the challenge, at least in certain cases, is coming from private-label alternatives.
Munger, back in 2013 (see pages 26-27), specifically mentioned Costco's (COST) private-label offering, Kirkland toothpaste, as an example of one threat.
Costco got one of the major toothpaste manufacturers of the world to make their toothpaste in Costco's tube at a very low price.
He also mentions the threat of Amazon (AMZN).
It's also possible for a new entrant to reach customers in an economically viable way that didn't really exist a couple decades ago. So enough scale to reach a big audience becomes less of an advantage.
What makes the situation even more challenging these days for investors is market valuation levels (even after the recent capital markets turmoil). Many of the consumer packaged goods businesses have gone from having reasonable equity valuations several years ago to fully valued and, in some cases, even expensive.**
That also doesn't mean they've, in general, suddenly become terrible businesses. Hardly. Some continue to have some very wide and likely rather sustainable moats. The very best of the small ticket branded goods makers appear to still have very sound businesses even if somewhat less so than the past several decades. Yet, like anything else, the price paid matters and right now few, if any, seem to be selling at a meaningful discount to per share intrinsic value.
I think Charlie Munger's point, more generally, is an essential one for just about any investor. No matter how good a business has been in the past, it's necessary to carefully consider how competition, technology, regulations, and customer behavior (among other things) could end up altering the core economics of a business over time.
The competitive position of any business -- and how it might be changing -- is an all-important consideration for equity investors. Most of what matters won't necessarily -- well, at least not early enough to be useful -- show up in the numbers. So financial statements and complex spreadsheets likely won't offer much insight. Sometimes, what matters most can't be measured in a meaningful way. It ends up being more about the qualitative factors.
In other words, an investor mostly won't be able effectively anticipate changes by simply looking at what can be quantified precisely.
What was once a wide moat can become much reduced, or even disappear altogether, over time. Sometimes it happens quickly; other times it's more of a slow degradation. The key is finding those businesses with very substantial and sustainable moats run by managers focused on making those moats more formidable.
Warren Buffett once said:
"We like to own castles with large moats filled with sharks and crocodiles that can fend off marauders -- the millions of people with capital that want to take our capital. We think in terms of moats that are impossible to cross, and tell our managers to widen their moat every year, even if profits do not increase every year."
Notice that moat widening is given priority over near-term profits.
It's NOT necessarily about growth unless that growth happens to be the high return variety over the longer run.***
It's buying, at the right price, shares of businesses with high returns on capital that will likely prove sustainable.
It's NOT just about returns.
It's finding sensible ways to reduce the risk of permanent capital loss.
Adam
No position in DJCO, COST, or AMZN
* From some excellent notes that were taken at the meeting. These notes, presented in four parts, are well worth reading. Not a transcript.
** Warren Buffett recently talked about valuation levels, speaking specifically about the larger food companies, while on CNBC. He clearly doesn't see them as inexpensive these days. Of course, the fact that they may be not at all cheap reveals little or nothing about what the near or intermediate term price action might be.
*** Not all growth is good growth for investors. Growth is but one component of value that -- while sometimes a positive -- is not necessarily a positive, though some seem to assume that's the case. There are slow growth businesses that produce attractive investment results and fast growth businesses that do not. Some of this comes down to the price paid upfront but that's only part of the story.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
How many big companies stay totally on top forever? Maybe Wrigley's Gum.
Then later added...
It's a competitive world out there. Somebody is always starting something. Even for the branded goods makers, who looked so invincible for forty years. The natural course of competition is that it gets tough. It's the people who expect everything to just keep going wonderfully who are nuts.
So at least some of these businesses are not quite as bulletproof as they used to be. Part of the challenge, at least in certain cases, is coming from private-label alternatives.
Munger, back in 2013 (see pages 26-27), specifically mentioned Costco's (COST) private-label offering, Kirkland toothpaste, as an example of one threat.
Costco got one of the major toothpaste manufacturers of the world to make their toothpaste in Costco's tube at a very low price.
He also mentions the threat of Amazon (AMZN).
It's also possible for a new entrant to reach customers in an economically viable way that didn't really exist a couple decades ago. So enough scale to reach a big audience becomes less of an advantage.
What makes the situation even more challenging these days for investors is market valuation levels (even after the recent capital markets turmoil). Many of the consumer packaged goods businesses have gone from having reasonable equity valuations several years ago to fully valued and, in some cases, even expensive.**
That also doesn't mean they've, in general, suddenly become terrible businesses. Hardly. Some continue to have some very wide and likely rather sustainable moats. The very best of the small ticket branded goods makers appear to still have very sound businesses even if somewhat less so than the past several decades. Yet, like anything else, the price paid matters and right now few, if any, seem to be selling at a meaningful discount to per share intrinsic value.
I think Charlie Munger's point, more generally, is an essential one for just about any investor. No matter how good a business has been in the past, it's necessary to carefully consider how competition, technology, regulations, and customer behavior (among other things) could end up altering the core economics of a business over time.
The competitive position of any business -- and how it might be changing -- is an all-important consideration for equity investors. Most of what matters won't necessarily -- well, at least not early enough to be useful -- show up in the numbers. So financial statements and complex spreadsheets likely won't offer much insight. Sometimes, what matters most can't be measured in a meaningful way. It ends up being more about the qualitative factors.
In other words, an investor mostly won't be able effectively anticipate changes by simply looking at what can be quantified precisely.
What was once a wide moat can become much reduced, or even disappear altogether, over time. Sometimes it happens quickly; other times it's more of a slow degradation. The key is finding those businesses with very substantial and sustainable moats run by managers focused on making those moats more formidable.
Warren Buffett once said:
"We like to own castles with large moats filled with sharks and crocodiles that can fend off marauders -- the millions of people with capital that want to take our capital. We think in terms of moats that are impossible to cross, and tell our managers to widen their moat every year, even if profits do not increase every year."
Notice that moat widening is given priority over near-term profits.
It's NOT necessarily about growth unless that growth happens to be the high return variety over the longer run.***
It's NOT just about returns.
It's finding sensible ways to reduce the risk of permanent capital loss.
Adam
No position in DJCO, COST, or AMZN
* From some excellent notes that were taken at the meeting. These notes, presented in four parts, are well worth reading. Not a transcript.
** Warren Buffett recently talked about valuation levels, speaking specifically about the larger food companies, while on CNBC. He clearly doesn't see them as inexpensive these days. Of course, the fact that they may be not at all cheap reveals little or nothing about what the near or intermediate term price action might be.
*** Not all growth is good growth for investors. Growth is but one component of value that -- while sometimes a positive -- is not necessarily a positive, though some seem to assume that's the case. There are slow growth businesses that produce attractive investment results and fast growth businesses that do not. Some of this comes down to the price paid upfront but that's only part of the story.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Monday, August 17, 2015
Berkshire Hathaway 2nd Quarter 2015 13F-HR
The Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) 2nd Quarter 13F-HR was released yesterday. Below is a summary of the changes that were made to the Berkshire equity portfolio during that quarter.*
(For a convenient comparison, here's a post from last quarter that summarizes Berkshire's 1st Quarter 13F-HR.)
Added to Existing Positions
U.S. Bancorp (USB): 1.3 mil. shares (1.5% incr.); tot. stake $ 3.69 bil.
Charter (CHTR): 2.5 mil. shares (42%); tot. stake $ 1.46 bil.
I've included above only those positions worth at least $ 1 billion at the end of the 2nd quarter. In a portfolio this size -- roughly $ 244 billion (equities, fixed income, cash, and other investments) as of the latest available filing with roughly half made up of common stocks** -- a position that's less than $ 1 billion doesn't really move the needle much.
One brand new position was also added during the quarter.
New Position
Axalta (AXTA): 20 mil. shares; tot. stake $ 662 mil.
(Previously announced.)
Not all of the activity has been disclosed. In the 2nd quarter of 2015, apparently some activity was kept confidential. Berkshire's latest filing says: "Confidential information has been omitted from the public Form 13F report and filed separately with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission."
Occasionally, the SEC allows Berkshire to keep certain moves in the portfolio confidential. The permission is granted by the SEC when a case can be made that the disclosure may cause buyers to drive up the price before Berkshire makes its additional purchases.
(Though some of the holdings they're responsible for have become more substantial over time.)
Top Five Holdings
After the changes, Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio of equity securities remains mostly made up of financial, consumer and, to a lesser extent, technology stocks (mostly IBM).
1. Wells Fargo (WFC) = $ 26.4 bil.
2. Coca-Cola (KO) = $ 15.7 bil.
3. IBM (IBM) = $ 12.9 bil.
4. American Express (AXP) = $ 11.8 bil.
5. Wal-Mart (WMT) = $ 4.28 bil.
As is almost always the case it's a very concentrated portfolio. The top five often represent 60-70 percent and, at times, even more of the equity portfolio. In addition, Berkshire owns equity securities listed on exchanges outside the U.S., plus fixed maturity securities, cash and cash equivalents, and other investments.
The portfolio excludes all the operating businesses that Berkshire owns outright with ~ 340,000 employees (25 being at headquarters) according to the latest letter.
Here are some examples of Berkshire's non-insurance businesses:
MidAmerican Energy, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, McLane Company, The Marmon Group, Shaw Industries, Benjamin Moore, Johns Manville, Acme Building, MiTek, Fruit of the Loom, Russell Athletic Apparel, NetJets, Nebraska Furniture Mart, See's Candies, Dairy Queen, The Pampered Chef, Business Wire, Iscar, Lubrizol, and Oriental Trading Company.
(Among others.)
In addition, the insurance businesses (BH Reinsurance, General Re, GEICO etc.) owned by Berkshire have naturally provided plenty of "float" for their investments over time and continue to do so.
See page 125 of the 2014 annual report for a full list of Berkshire's businesses.
Adam
Long positions in BRKb, WFC, KO, AXP, USB, WMT, and PSX established at much lower than recent market prices. Also, long position in IBM established at slightly higher than recent market prices. (In each case compared to average cost basis.)
* All values shown are based upon the last trading day of the 2nd quarter.
** Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of ADRs are included in the 13F. What is not included are shares listed on exchanges outside the United States. The status of those shares, if a large enough position, are updated in the annual letter. So the only way any of the stocks listed on exchanges outside the U.S. will show up in the 13F is if Berkshire buys the ADR. Investments in things like preferred shares (and valuable warrants, where applicable, as explained in the recent letters) are also not included in the 13F. The same has been true for not only the Heinz (now Kraft Heinz) preferred shares, but also the common shares. A deal to combine Kraft and Heinz was announced earlier this year and closed on July 2nd, 2015. So, as a result, Berkshire will now own roughly 26.9% of the combined Kraft Heinz Company (KHC) with the stake being accounted for using the equity method. See Note 7 of in Berkshire's latest 10-Q for additional details. The investment will now represent one of Berkshire's largest positions.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
(For a convenient comparison, here's a post from last quarter that summarizes Berkshire's 1st Quarter 13F-HR.)
Added to Existing Positions
U.S. Bancorp (USB): 1.3 mil. shares (1.5% incr.); tot. stake $ 3.69 bil.
Charter (CHTR): 2.5 mil. shares (42%); tot. stake $ 1.46 bil.
I've included above only those positions worth at least $ 1 billion at the end of the 2nd quarter. In a portfolio this size -- roughly $ 244 billion (equities, fixed income, cash, and other investments) as of the latest available filing with roughly half made up of common stocks** -- a position that's less than $ 1 billion doesn't really move the needle much.
One brand new position was also added during the quarter.
New Position
Axalta (AXTA): 20 mil. shares; tot. stake $ 662 mil.
(Previously announced.)
Not all of the activity has been disclosed. In the 2nd quarter of 2015, apparently some activity was kept confidential. Berkshire's latest filing says: "Confidential information has been omitted from the public Form 13F report and filed separately with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission."
Occasionally, the SEC allows Berkshire to keep certain moves in the portfolio confidential. The permission is granted by the SEC when a case can be made that the disclosure may cause buyers to drive up the price before Berkshire makes its additional purchases.
Reduced Positions
Positions that were reduced somewhat but not sold outright include WABCO (WBC), Chicago Bridge & Iron (CBI), and Viacom (VIAB) with each worth less than $ 1 billion.
Sold Positions
Positions that were sold include National Oilwell Varco (NOV) and Phillips 66 (PSX).
Todd Combs and Ted Weschler are responsible for an increasingly large number of the moves in the Berkshire equity portfolio. These days, any changes involving smaller positions will generally be the work of the two portfolio managers.Positions that were reduced somewhat but not sold outright include WABCO (WBC), Chicago Bridge & Iron (CBI), and Viacom (VIAB) with each worth less than $ 1 billion.
Sold Positions
Positions that were sold include National Oilwell Varco (NOV) and Phillips 66 (PSX).
(Though some of the holdings they're responsible for have become more substantial over time.)
Top Five Holdings
After the changes, Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio of equity securities remains mostly made up of financial, consumer and, to a lesser extent, technology stocks (mostly IBM).
1. Wells Fargo (WFC) = $ 26.4 bil.
2. Coca-Cola (KO) = $ 15.7 bil.
3. IBM (IBM) = $ 12.9 bil.
4. American Express (AXP) = $ 11.8 bil.
5. Wal-Mart (WMT) = $ 4.28 bil.
As is almost always the case it's a very concentrated portfolio. The top five often represent 60-70 percent and, at times, even more of the equity portfolio. In addition, Berkshire owns equity securities listed on exchanges outside the U.S., plus fixed maturity securities, cash and cash equivalents, and other investments.
The portfolio excludes all the operating businesses that Berkshire owns outright with ~ 340,000 employees (25 being at headquarters) according to the latest letter.
Here are some examples of Berkshire's non-insurance businesses:
MidAmerican Energy, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, McLane Company, The Marmon Group, Shaw Industries, Benjamin Moore, Johns Manville, Acme Building, MiTek, Fruit of the Loom, Russell Athletic Apparel, NetJets, Nebraska Furniture Mart, See's Candies, Dairy Queen, The Pampered Chef, Business Wire, Iscar, Lubrizol, and Oriental Trading Company.
(Among others.)
In addition, the insurance businesses (BH Reinsurance, General Re, GEICO etc.) owned by Berkshire have naturally provided plenty of "float" for their investments over time and continue to do so.
See page 125 of the 2014 annual report for a full list of Berkshire's businesses.
Adam
Long positions in BRKb, WFC, KO, AXP, USB, WMT, and PSX established at much lower than recent market prices. Also, long position in IBM established at slightly higher than recent market prices. (In each case compared to average cost basis.)
* All values shown are based upon the last trading day of the 2nd quarter.
** Berkshire Hathaway's holdings of ADRs are included in the 13F. What is not included are shares listed on exchanges outside the United States. The status of those shares, if a large enough position, are updated in the annual letter. So the only way any of the stocks listed on exchanges outside the U.S. will show up in the 13F is if Berkshire buys the ADR. Investments in things like preferred shares (and valuable warrants, where applicable, as explained in the recent letters) are also not included in the 13F. The same has been true for not only the Heinz (now Kraft Heinz) preferred shares, but also the common shares. A deal to combine Kraft and Heinz was announced earlier this year and closed on July 2nd, 2015. So, as a result, Berkshire will now own roughly 26.9% of the combined Kraft Heinz Company (KHC) with the stake being accounted for using the equity method. See Note 7 of in Berkshire's latest 10-Q for additional details. The investment will now represent one of Berkshire's largest positions.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Activists & the AmEx Buyback, Part I
On Friday of last week, the news broke that ValueAct Capital Management, an activist hedge fund, had taken a stake in American Express (AXP).
Some might think, since the stock rallied right after the announcement, that this should be received as good news by AmEx shareholders.
Clearly, for a trader (or someone who intends to sell their AmEx shares in near-term) that's understandably the case.
Yet a long-term investor in the stock shouldn't necessarily view this development as being a good thing. At most, until more is known, it logically deserves a more mixed reaction.
This has nothing specifically to do with ValueAct. They may be very good at what they do and, depending on their intentions and capabilities, could even prove helpful to AmEx's prospects over the long run.
Then why should the reaction be more mixed? Well, consider that the company has already announced it intends to repurchase "up to $6.6 billion of common shares during the period beginning in Q2 2015 through and including Q2 2016."
When a company is repurchasing stock in a meaningful way -- and for one with a market value just over $ 80 billion I think buying $ 6.6 billion of its stock over 5 quarters or so qualifies -- no long-term owner should be happy about the shares rallying. It simply means that, if the recent rally in price proves persistent (or worse...goes higher), the funds used in the AmEx buyback program will go less far and, as a result, the share count will drop by a smaller amount.
Plainly, all else equal, that is not a good thing for the long-term owner.
Also, if the rally were to continue higher, at some point the price might become such that it makes no sense to continue buying back the shares (i.e. as the price gets closer to per share intrinsic value). Again, that further rally might satisfy those who are in for the short haul but makes little sense for those who plan on being continuing owners of AmEx shares for a long time.*
It comes down to this: shareholders who prefer for their investment outcomes to be driven by what the business can produce in excess cash over decades will, inevitably, have a very different agenda than those who emphasize profiting from price action. Of course, the long-term investor will eventually want to see the share price at least roughly track changes in per share intrinsic value. It's just that a delay in the recognition can be hugely beneficial.
AmEx repurchased roughly $ 1.2 billion during Q2 2015. Not quite on pace for $ 6.6 billion but reasonably close. At least for now it appears they are following through on the plan.
Yet that's not what's most important. While sometimes a buyback plan will not become reality, it's the reason they don't become reality that matters.
Buybacks can make sense when both a stock is cheap -- i.e. selling at a nice discount to per share intrinsic value -- and available funds are more than sufficient to meet all the operational/liquidity needs of the business.
Well, at times, a buyback program will continue to be implemented even if one or both of these things no longer proves true.
(Worse yet is a buyback plan that's been put in place for the wrong reasons and is then implemented.)
Unfortunately, buyback announcements like this aren't always followed by wise action based upon changing circumstances.
How price compares to value and business needs (and how these things change over time) must be considered. Rigidity, at least when it comes to buyback programs but also more generally, isn't a virtue.
In business and investing flexibility often wins.
In other words, it's possible that circumstances will develop such that what was once a well-intentioned buyback plan shouldn't be implemented.
Back in May of this year, Warren Buffett spoke on CNBC about activist investors in the context of it's largest holdings (of which AmEx is one).
Keep in mind that he said the following well before ValueAct decided to invest in AmEx:
"I think it'd be very silly for an activist to come in and say double your dividend today or buy in a whole lot more stock or whatever it might be they would be proposing. I think the companies are well run and I think their financial policies are sound."
He added that when you have "a well-run company, the best thing to do is just to sit back and enjoy it."
Naturally, this doesn't mean ValueAct won't ultimately end up having a positive effect.
They just may.
We'll see in due time what kind of activist role, if any, they intend to play.
More in a follow-up.
Adam
Long position in AXP established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
Activists & the AmEx buyback, Part II (follow-up)
Altria: Price Matters
Multiple Expansion, Buybacks, & The P/E Illusion
The P/E Illusion
The Benefits of a Declining Stock
Buffett's Purchase of IBM Revisited
Buffett on Buybacks, Book Value, and Intrinsic Value
Buffett on Teledyne's Henry Singleton
Why Buffett Wants IBM's Shares "To Languish"
Buffett: When it's Advisable for a Company to Repurchase Shares
The Best Use of Corporate Cash
Buffett on Stock Buybacks - Part II
Buffett on Stock Buybacks
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?
* Some might argue the long-term owner could simply sell and either wait for a better price to buy again or invest elsewhere. That approach sounds better in theory than it is in practice. When shares sell at a substantial premium to value or, for example, when opportunity costs are high there are times selling will be warranted. Yet, at least for me, this kind of behavior can be a recipe for unnecessary mistakes. There's usually a limit to the number of businesses one can understand well. Better to own some good businesses -- at least those bought at a discount and understood well -- for a very long time. Minimize frictional costs; minimize mistakes.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Some might think, since the stock rallied right after the announcement, that this should be received as good news by AmEx shareholders.
Clearly, for a trader (or someone who intends to sell their AmEx shares in near-term) that's understandably the case.
Yet a long-term investor in the stock shouldn't necessarily view this development as being a good thing. At most, until more is known, it logically deserves a more mixed reaction.
This has nothing specifically to do with ValueAct. They may be very good at what they do and, depending on their intentions and capabilities, could even prove helpful to AmEx's prospects over the long run.
Then why should the reaction be more mixed? Well, consider that the company has already announced it intends to repurchase "up to $6.6 billion of common shares during the period beginning in Q2 2015 through and including Q2 2016."
When a company is repurchasing stock in a meaningful way -- and for one with a market value just over $ 80 billion I think buying $ 6.6 billion of its stock over 5 quarters or so qualifies -- no long-term owner should be happy about the shares rallying. It simply means that, if the recent rally in price proves persistent (or worse...goes higher), the funds used in the AmEx buyback program will go less far and, as a result, the share count will drop by a smaller amount.
Plainly, all else equal, that is not a good thing for the long-term owner.
Also, if the rally were to continue higher, at some point the price might become such that it makes no sense to continue buying back the shares (i.e. as the price gets closer to per share intrinsic value). Again, that further rally might satisfy those who are in for the short haul but makes little sense for those who plan on being continuing owners of AmEx shares for a long time.*
It comes down to this: shareholders who prefer for their investment outcomes to be driven by what the business can produce in excess cash over decades will, inevitably, have a very different agenda than those who emphasize profiting from price action. Of course, the long-term investor will eventually want to see the share price at least roughly track changes in per share intrinsic value. It's just that a delay in the recognition can be hugely beneficial.
AmEx repurchased roughly $ 1.2 billion during Q2 2015. Not quite on pace for $ 6.6 billion but reasonably close. At least for now it appears they are following through on the plan.
Yet that's not what's most important. While sometimes a buyback plan will not become reality, it's the reason they don't become reality that matters.
Buybacks can make sense when both a stock is cheap -- i.e. selling at a nice discount to per share intrinsic value -- and available funds are more than sufficient to meet all the operational/liquidity needs of the business.
Well, at times, a buyback program will continue to be implemented even if one or both of these things no longer proves true.
(Worse yet is a buyback plan that's been put in place for the wrong reasons and is then implemented.)
Unfortunately, buyback announcements like this aren't always followed by wise action based upon changing circumstances.
How price compares to value and business needs (and how these things change over time) must be considered. Rigidity, at least when it comes to buyback programs but also more generally, isn't a virtue.
In business and investing flexibility often wins.
In other words, it's possible that circumstances will develop such that what was once a well-intentioned buyback plan shouldn't be implemented.
Back in May of this year, Warren Buffett spoke on CNBC about activist investors in the context of it's largest holdings (of which AmEx is one).
Keep in mind that he said the following well before ValueAct decided to invest in AmEx:
"I think it'd be very silly for an activist to come in and say double your dividend today or buy in a whole lot more stock or whatever it might be they would be proposing. I think the companies are well run and I think their financial policies are sound."
He added that when you have "a well-run company, the best thing to do is just to sit back and enjoy it."
Naturally, this doesn't mean ValueAct won't ultimately end up having a positive effect.
They just may.
We'll see in due time what kind of activist role, if any, they intend to play.
More in a follow-up.
Adam
Long position in AXP established at much lower than recent prices
Related posts:
Activists & the AmEx buyback, Part II (follow-up)
Altria: Price Matters
Multiple Expansion, Buybacks, & The P/E Illusion
The P/E Illusion
The Benefits of a Declining Stock
Buffett's Purchase of IBM Revisited
Buffett on Buybacks, Book Value, and Intrinsic Value
Buffett on Teledyne's Henry Singleton
Why Buffett Wants IBM's Shares "To Languish"
Buffett: When it's Advisable for a Company to Repurchase Shares
The Best Use of Corporate Cash
Buffett on Stock Buybacks - Part II
Buffett on Stock Buybacks
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?
* Some might argue the long-term owner could simply sell and either wait for a better price to buy again or invest elsewhere. That approach sounds better in theory than it is in practice. When shares sell at a substantial premium to value or, for example, when opportunity costs are high there are times selling will be warranted. Yet, at least for me, this kind of behavior can be a recipe for unnecessary mistakes. There's usually a limit to the number of businesses one can understand well. Better to own some good businesses -- at least those bought at a discount and understood well -- for a very long time. Minimize frictional costs; minimize mistakes.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
What's Gold Intrinsically Worth?
For roughly a decade, starting in 2001, gold prices performed extremely well.
So fans of the yellow stuff will rightly point to that fact.
I'll say upfront that I have just about zero interest in owning gold or any other nonproductive asset. Yet I'm certainly familiar with some of the arguments that are made for owning gold. As is often the case, Jim Grant is thoughtful on the subject of gold (and many other things related to finance and financial history) and worth paying attention to whether or not you happen to agree with him.
Grant points out that the dollar -- and this clearly applies to other paper currencies -- has "no intrinsic value" and is "faith-based."
Can't really argue with that but I think Jeremy Grantham makes a fair point when he says:
"...just as Jim Grant tells us (correctly) that we all have faith-based paper currencies backed by nothing, it is equally fair to say that gold is a faith-based metal. It pays no dividend, cannot be eaten, and is mostly used for nothing more useful than jewelry."
Grant does, in fact, think it makes sense to own gold recently calling it "an investment in financial and monetary disorder."
He also makes his case for a return to the gold standard.
"...the existing monetary arrangements are so precarious, so ill-founded and so destructive of the economic activity they are supposed to support and nurture, that they will be replaced by something better."
For Grant, that'd be a monetary system directly linked to the quantity of gold that can be dug up over time.
Those who share these views (and similar ones) may even prove to be right.
I certainly agree that a paper currency, even under the very best of circumstances, is likely -- if not certain -- to diminish in value over the longer haul. Inflation of some kind or another should erode the purchasing power of just about any currency over time whether or not there is a full-blown currency crisis.
The question is what to do about it.
I think that Grantham has it essentially just about right:
"I believe that resources in the ground, forestry, agriculture, common stocks, and even real estate are more certain to resist any inflation or paper currency crisis than is gold."
For me, the problem has been and remains estimating what gold is intrinsically worth.
Unlike a high quality business it doesn't produce any cash.
Gold's value is perceived, or maybe relative, but it's not intrinsic.
Jason Zweig explains it this way:
"...you will put lightning in a bottle before you figure out what gold is really worth."
WSJ: Let's Be Honest About Gold: It's a Pet Rock
Without a stream of free cash flow how can what something is intrinsically worth, if anything, be known within a narrow enough range?
Warren Buffett, much like Grantham, also suggests that productive assets* are the way to go: "Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor" to buy something like their favorite soda or candy.
Investing in a productive asset is very different than attempting to guess what someone else will be willing to pay for a lump of metal down the road. Here's what Buffett once said on CNBC:
"...it is an entirely different game to buy a lump of something and hope that somebody else pays you more for that lump two years from now than it is to buy something you expect to produce income for you over time."
Some may know (or think they know) where the price of gold is headed.
I have no idea and never will.
In fact, I'll never spend a moment trying to guess such a thing.
Zweig writes the following about those who are the truest believers -- the so-called "gold bugs" -- in the wisdom of gold ownership.
"Recognize...that gold bugs...often resemble the subjects of a laboratory experiment on the psychology of cognitive dissonance.
When you are in the grip of cognitive dissonance, anything that could be regarded as evidence that you might be wrong becomes proof that you must be right."
He then added this line:
"You don't want to be one of these people, spending years telling reality that it is wrong."
Zweig's article shows that for the past forty years or so the faith-based yellow metal has not generated much in terms or relative or absolute returns:
Avg Annual Return Since 1975 (after inflation)
- Gold: 0.8%
- Bonds: 5.0% ,
- Stocks: 8.3%
- Cash: 1.1%
Maybe the future will prove very different.
Personally, I'd be surprised if stocks or bonds do nearly as well going forward considering current valuations especially if (when?) interest rates normalize.
Gold?
No idea.
Few asset categories, broadly speaking, are plainly inexpensive though there's almost always some individual investment that's selling at a discount for situation specific reasons.
(The tough part being to find one you understand well enough to invest.)
Charlie Munger is, to say the least, usually rather forthright and has a unique way of getting to the point. Well, here's how he looks at gold:
"I don't have the slightest interest in gold. I like understanding what works and what doesn't in human systems. To me that's not optional; that's a moral obligation. If you're capable of understanding the world, you have a moral obligation to become rational. And I don't see how you become rational hoarding gold. Even if it works, you're a jerk."
And one final thought on gold from Jeremy Grantham...
"I hate gold. It does not pay a dividend, it has no value, and you can't work out what it should or shouldn't be worth...It is the last refuge of the desperate."
Of course, for all I know, gold will do very well in the future.
This is irrelevant for me since I have no way of valuing it.
For me it's simple:
If I don't know how to value something, I shouldn't own it.
Adam
Related posts:
-Buffett & Munger on Gold
-Buffett on Productive Assets
-Buffett: Why Stocks Beat Gold
-Buffett: Why Stocks Beat Bonds
-Buffett on Gold, Farms, and Businesses
-Edison on Gold: Fictitious Value & Superstition
-Munger on Buying Gold
-Thomas Edison on Gold
-Grantham on Gold: The "Faith-based Metal"
-Buffett: Forget Gold, Buy Stocks
-Gold vs Productive Assets
-Grantham: Gold is "Last Refuge of the Desperate"
-Why Buffett's Not a Big Fan of Gold
* Examples of what Buffett calls productive assets:
- Businesses (incl. partial ownership of businesses via marketable stocks)
- Farms
- Real Estate
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
So fans of the yellow stuff will rightly point to that fact.
I'll say upfront that I have just about zero interest in owning gold or any other nonproductive asset. Yet I'm certainly familiar with some of the arguments that are made for owning gold. As is often the case, Jim Grant is thoughtful on the subject of gold (and many other things related to finance and financial history) and worth paying attention to whether or not you happen to agree with him.
Grant points out that the dollar -- and this clearly applies to other paper currencies -- has "no intrinsic value" and is "faith-based."
Can't really argue with that but I think Jeremy Grantham makes a fair point when he says:
"...just as Jim Grant tells us (correctly) that we all have faith-based paper currencies backed by nothing, it is equally fair to say that gold is a faith-based metal. It pays no dividend, cannot be eaten, and is mostly used for nothing more useful than jewelry."
Grant does, in fact, think it makes sense to own gold recently calling it "an investment in financial and monetary disorder."
He also makes his case for a return to the gold standard.
"...the existing monetary arrangements are so precarious, so ill-founded and so destructive of the economic activity they are supposed to support and nurture, that they will be replaced by something better."
For Grant, that'd be a monetary system directly linked to the quantity of gold that can be dug up over time.
Those who share these views (and similar ones) may even prove to be right.
I certainly agree that a paper currency, even under the very best of circumstances, is likely -- if not certain -- to diminish in value over the longer haul. Inflation of some kind or another should erode the purchasing power of just about any currency over time whether or not there is a full-blown currency crisis.
The question is what to do about it.
I think that Grantham has it essentially just about right:
"I believe that resources in the ground, forestry, agriculture, common stocks, and even real estate are more certain to resist any inflation or paper currency crisis than is gold."
For me, the problem has been and remains estimating what gold is intrinsically worth.
Unlike a high quality business it doesn't produce any cash.
Gold's value is perceived, or maybe relative, but it's not intrinsic.
Jason Zweig explains it this way:
"...you will put lightning in a bottle before you figure out what gold is really worth."
WSJ: Let's Be Honest About Gold: It's a Pet Rock
Without a stream of free cash flow how can what something is intrinsically worth, if anything, be known within a narrow enough range?
Warren Buffett, much like Grantham, also suggests that productive assets* are the way to go: "Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor" to buy something like their favorite soda or candy.
Investing in a productive asset is very different than attempting to guess what someone else will be willing to pay for a lump of metal down the road. Here's what Buffett once said on CNBC:
"...it is an entirely different game to buy a lump of something and hope that somebody else pays you more for that lump two years from now than it is to buy something you expect to produce income for you over time."
Some may know (or think they know) where the price of gold is headed.
I have no idea and never will.
In fact, I'll never spend a moment trying to guess such a thing.
Zweig writes the following about those who are the truest believers -- the so-called "gold bugs" -- in the wisdom of gold ownership.
"Recognize...that gold bugs...often resemble the subjects of a laboratory experiment on the psychology of cognitive dissonance.
When you are in the grip of cognitive dissonance, anything that could be regarded as evidence that you might be wrong becomes proof that you must be right."
He then added this line:
"You don't want to be one of these people, spending years telling reality that it is wrong."
Avg Annual Return Since 1975 (after inflation)
- Gold: 0.8%
- Bonds: 5.0% ,
- Stocks: 8.3%
- Cash: 1.1%
Maybe the future will prove very different.
Personally, I'd be surprised if stocks or bonds do nearly as well going forward considering current valuations especially if (when?) interest rates normalize.
Gold?
No idea.
Few asset categories, broadly speaking, are plainly inexpensive though there's almost always some individual investment that's selling at a discount for situation specific reasons.
(The tough part being to find one you understand well enough to invest.)
Charlie Munger is, to say the least, usually rather forthright and has a unique way of getting to the point. Well, here's how he looks at gold:
"I don't have the slightest interest in gold. I like understanding what works and what doesn't in human systems. To me that's not optional; that's a moral obligation. If you're capable of understanding the world, you have a moral obligation to become rational. And I don't see how you become rational hoarding gold. Even if it works, you're a jerk."
And one final thought on gold from Jeremy Grantham...
"I hate gold. It does not pay a dividend, it has no value, and you can't work out what it should or shouldn't be worth...It is the last refuge of the desperate."
Of course, for all I know, gold will do very well in the future.
This is irrelevant for me since I have no way of valuing it.
For me it's simple:
If I don't know how to value something, I shouldn't own it.
Adam
Related posts:
-Buffett & Munger on Gold
-Buffett on Productive Assets
-Buffett: Why Stocks Beat Gold
-Buffett: Why Stocks Beat Bonds
-Buffett on Gold, Farms, and Businesses
-Edison on Gold: Fictitious Value & Superstition
-Munger on Buying Gold
-Thomas Edison on Gold
-Grantham on Gold: The "Faith-based Metal"
-Buffett: Forget Gold, Buy Stocks
-Gold vs Productive Assets
-Grantham: Gold is "Last Refuge of the Desperate"
-Why Buffett's Not a Big Fan of Gold
* Examples of what Buffett calls productive assets:
- Businesses (incl. partial ownership of businesses via marketable stocks)
- Farms
- Real Estate
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
Hedge Funds: Balancing Risk & Reward?
This recent article by Brett Arends points out hedge funds have not performed all that well this year.
The same goes for recent years. Arends writes those "who put 20% of their money in a federally insured bank savings account, and the other 80% in a random collection of stocks from around the world, picked by monkeys," outperformed in a meaningful way hedge funds in 2012, 2013, 2014, and so far in 2015.
Well, at least to me, that seems a rather too short time frame to judge relative performance.
In this article, Morgan Housel looked at a somewhat longer period of time. He points out, from 2002-2013, hedge funds underperformed a simple mix of 60% in stocks and 40% in bonds.*
The 60/40 mix had slightly higher returns along with slightly lower volatility.**
Some hedge funds argue that their goal isn't to match or beat the S&P 500, it's to balance potential rewards with downside risk and limit volatility or something similar. So, with this in mind, both Arends and Housel chose to compare hedge fund returns to a mix that similarly attempts to balance rewards with downside risk.
I'd add that some make the assumption that risk and reward need always be positively correlated.
Well, that's just not necessarily the case.
Now, consider that the typical fees of a hedge fund will be something like two percent of assets under management plus twenty percent of the profits generated (if any).
The two percent is generally paid by investors whether there's a profit or loss.
Arends points out that this means...
"Do the math. If the average investment portfolio earns 6% a year, your hedge fund manager has to earn 9.5% before fees before you even break even. In other words, the manager has to beat the market by about 60%. Per year. Good luck with that."
It may not be impossible to outperform by that much, but consider how many experts underperform over the longer run with, in general, a much lower frictional drag from fees. Also, consider how these fees impact the risk-reward for investors. In other words, the act of reducing fees would, in itself, take out some of the downside risk which is what the hedge funds often contend is a prime objective.
And the above hedge fund results just might be an optimistic take. It turns out that the "hedge-fund indexes flatter the industry's performance, because they are weighted heavily towards the funds that survive and report data."
So how has hedge fund performance affected investor behavior?
Is there any evidence investors are moving out of hedge funds?
Not at all.
From an article in the Wall Street Journal:
"Large corporate pension funds have quadrupled the share of their portfolios invested in hedge funds over the past five years..."
More generally, hedge fund assets under management is now, depending on the source, something like like $ 2.5 trillion or maybe even $ 3.0 trillion in assets. Big numbers. That compares to just $ 38 billion in 1990. So hedge funds have been gathering assets in a substantial way over the past two and a half decades (and in more recent years). At their current size, these funds will collect some serious fees from their investors, including those pension funds, with just mediocre performance.
(The management fees alone would be $ 50-60 billion even if no profits are generated.)
I'm not necessarily surprised by this sort of thing. Better to simply recognize why the behavior exists then do whatever can be done to avoid it.
This paper looks specifically at hedge fund investor performance from 1980-2008:
"...we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008.The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought."
This inevitably now has a big impact on institutional investors (pensions, foundations, educational institutions). Why? Apparently, at least 60% of the money invested in hedge funds these days comes from institutional investors.
Adam
Related posts:
Index Funds vs Actively Managed Funds
John Bogle on Investor Returns
Buffett's Hedge Fund Bet
John Bogle's "Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic", Part II
Index Fund Investing Revisited
Charlie Munger on Complexity, Hedge Funds, and Pension Funds
Why Do So Many Investors Underperform?
When Mutual Funds Outperform Their Investors
John Bogle's "Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic"
Investor Overconfidence Revisited
Newton's Fourth Law
Investor Overconfidence
Chasing "Rearview-Mirror Performance"
Index Fund Investing
Investors Are Often Their Own Worst Enemies, Part II
Investors Are Often Their Own Worst Enemies
The Illusion of Skill
Buffett's Bet Against Hedge Funds, Part II
Buffett's Bet Against Hedge Funds
The Illusion of Control
Buffett, Bogle, and the "Invisible Foot" Revisited
If Buffett Were Paid Like a Hedge Fund Manager - Part II
If Buffett Were Paid Like a Hedge Fund Manager
Buffett, Bogle, and the Invisible Foot
Charlie Munger on LTCM & Overconfidence
"Nothing But Costs"
Bogle: History and the Classics
When Genius Failed...Again
* Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (60/40). The fund, like many from Vanguard, is rather low cost relative to peers.
** Volatility is not the definition of risk though some choose to treat it that way.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
The same goes for recent years. Arends writes those "who put 20% of their money in a federally insured bank savings account, and the other 80% in a random collection of stocks from around the world, picked by monkeys," outperformed in a meaningful way hedge funds in 2012, 2013, 2014, and so far in 2015.
Well, at least to me, that seems a rather too short time frame to judge relative performance.
In this article, Morgan Housel looked at a somewhat longer period of time. He points out, from 2002-2013, hedge funds underperformed a simple mix of 60% in stocks and 40% in bonds.*
The 60/40 mix had slightly higher returns along with slightly lower volatility.**
I'd add that some make the assumption that risk and reward need always be positively correlated.
Well, that's just not necessarily the case.
Now, consider that the typical fees of a hedge fund will be something like two percent of assets under management plus twenty percent of the profits generated (if any).
The two percent is generally paid by investors whether there's a profit or loss.
Arends points out that this means...
"Do the math. If the average investment portfolio earns 6% a year, your hedge fund manager has to earn 9.5% before fees before you even break even. In other words, the manager has to beat the market by about 60%. Per year. Good luck with that."
It may not be impossible to outperform by that much, but consider how many experts underperform over the longer run with, in general, a much lower frictional drag from fees. Also, consider how these fees impact the risk-reward for investors. In other words, the act of reducing fees would, in itself, take out some of the downside risk which is what the hedge funds often contend is a prime objective.
And the above hedge fund results just might be an optimistic take. It turns out that the "hedge-fund indexes flatter the industry's performance, because they are weighted heavily towards the funds that survive and report data."
So how has hedge fund performance affected investor behavior?
Is there any evidence investors are moving out of hedge funds?
Not at all.
From an article in the Wall Street Journal:
"Large corporate pension funds have quadrupled the share of their portfolios invested in hedge funds over the past five years..."
More generally, hedge fund assets under management is now, depending on the source, something like like $ 2.5 trillion or maybe even $ 3.0 trillion in assets. Big numbers. That compares to just $ 38 billion in 1990. So hedge funds have been gathering assets in a substantial way over the past two and a half decades (and in more recent years). At their current size, these funds will collect some serious fees from their investors, including those pension funds, with just mediocre performance.
(The management fees alone would be $ 50-60 billion even if no profits are generated.)
I'm not necessarily surprised by this sort of thing. Better to simply recognize why the behavior exists then do whatever can be done to avoid it.
This paper looks specifically at hedge fund investor performance from 1980-2008:
"...we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008.The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought."
This inevitably now has a big impact on institutional investors (pensions, foundations, educational institutions). Why? Apparently, at least 60% of the money invested in hedge funds these days comes from institutional investors.
Adam
Related posts:
Index Funds vs Actively Managed Funds
John Bogle on Investor Returns
Buffett's Hedge Fund Bet
John Bogle's "Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic", Part II
Index Fund Investing Revisited
Charlie Munger on Complexity, Hedge Funds, and Pension Funds
Why Do So Many Investors Underperform?
When Mutual Funds Outperform Their Investors
John Bogle's "Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic"
Investor Overconfidence Revisited
Newton's Fourth Law
Investor Overconfidence
Chasing "Rearview-Mirror Performance"
Index Fund Investing
Investors Are Often Their Own Worst Enemies, Part II
Investors Are Often Their Own Worst Enemies
The Illusion of Skill
Buffett's Bet Against Hedge Funds, Part II
Buffett's Bet Against Hedge Funds
The Illusion of Control
Buffett, Bogle, and the "Invisible Foot" Revisited
If Buffett Were Paid Like a Hedge Fund Manager - Part II
If Buffett Were Paid Like a Hedge Fund Manager
Buffett, Bogle, and the Invisible Foot
Charlie Munger on LTCM & Overconfidence
"Nothing But Costs"
Bogle: History and the Classics
When Genius Failed...Again
* Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (60/40). The fund, like many from Vanguard, is rather low cost relative to peers.
** Volatility is not the definition of risk though some choose to treat it that way.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
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