A collection of quotes said or written at some point during this calendar year.
"A light-weight vehicle with a small carbon footprint using alternative energy and renewable resources to operate in a sustainable way– When I was a kid, we called it a Schwinn." - P.J O'Rourke Speaking at the Cato Forum
"What Wall Street does is package luck and sell it as skill." - Dan Solin on CNBC
"There's no reason to have a system where every young man has $8 billion to play with and buy whatever he wants. It's incredibly stupid. It's absolutely crazy. If I were in charge, I'd take away everything from banks that wasn't boring. Completely shut down [credit default swaps] 100%. What's the harm in this? The world worked just fine without them. We don't need an economy that resembles a vast poker tournament." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Meeting
"A man does not deserve huge amounts of pay for creating tiny spreads on huge amounts of money. Any idiot can do it. And, as a matter of fact, many idiots do it." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Meeting
"I remember the $0.05 hamburger and a $0.40-per-hour minimum wage, so I've seen a tremendous amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment climate? I think not." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Meeting
"The world will adapt to higher oil prices, because it has to. It won't be the end of the world. Even at $200 a barrel, we'd be fine. People would adapt. We have an enormous power to adapt." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Meeting
"I can't tell you how surprised, even embarrassed I was to get the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Yes, I had passed the dreaded chemistry A-level for 18-year-olds back in England in 1958. But did they realize it was my third attempt? And, yes, I will take this honor as encouragement to do some serious thinking on the topic. I will also invest the award to help save the planet. Perhaps that was really the Nobel Committee’s sneaky motive, since there are regrettably no green awards yet. Still, all in all, it didn't seem deserved." - Jeremy Grantham in the 3Q09 Letter
"Rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis are as dead as dodos, yet their baleful and painful influence lives on..." - Jeremy Grantham in the 3Q09 Letter
"Yes, of course every country needs a basic financial system to function effectively with letters of credit, deposits, and check writing facilities, etc. But as you move beyond that it is worth remembering that every valued job created by financial complexity is paid for by the rest of the real economy, and talent is displaced from real production, as symbolized by all of the nuclear physicists on prop trading desks." - Jeremy Grantham in the 3Q09 Letter
"Our model is a seamless web of trust that's deserved on both sides. That's what we're aiming for. The Hollywood model where everyone has a contract and no trust is deserved on either side is not what we want at all." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Meeting
"We don’t want relationships that are based on contracts. I can’t really think of a formal contract that we have. We have understandings about bonus arrangements with various managers. We have different arrangements because all the businesses are different. We don’t try to hold people by contracts and it wouldn't work. We basically don't like engaging in them." - Warren Buffett at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Meeting
"If you have a 150 IQ, sell 30 points to someone else. You need to be smart, but not a genius. What's most important is inner peace; you have to be able to think for yourself. It’s not a complicated game." - Warren Buffett at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Meeting
"We don't try to pick bottoms. To sit around and not do something sensible because you think there might be something better…. doesn't make sense. Picking bottoms is not our game. Pricing is our game. And that's not so difficult. Picking bottoms is, I think, impossible." - Warren Buffett at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Meeting
Happy New Year,
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Behavioral Bias
Here is a good post summarizing some of the many forms of behavioral bias. The biases covered include:
An excerpt:
"Unfortunately academic approaches which aim to replicate market behavior by tweaking efficient market models often don't translate well to the harsh, Darwinian world of real finance where people need to use these ideas to make money. Typically the models work right up to the point they don't, when they fail catastrophically."
This stuff is useful beyond improving investing results.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
- Overconfidence
- Hindsight Bias
- Loss aversion
- Regret
- Anchoring
An excerpt:
"Unfortunately academic approaches which aim to replicate market behavior by tweaking efficient market models often don't translate well to the harsh, Darwinian world of real finance where people need to use these ideas to make money. Typically the models work right up to the point they don't, when they fail catastrophically."
This stuff is useful beyond improving investing results.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Monday, December 28, 2009
Highly Probables: Berkshire Shareholder Letter Highlights
Warren Buffett wrote the following in the 1996 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) shareholder letter:
Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every inevitable, there are dozens of impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive attacks. Considering what it takes to be an inevitable, Charlie and I recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or even a Twinkling Twenty. To the inevitables in our portfolio, therefore, we add a few "highly probables."
In the letter, he refers to Coca-Cola (KO) and Gillette (now part of Procter & Gamble:PG) as "The Inevitables".
Adam
Long BRKb, KO, and PG
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every inevitable, there are dozens of impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive attacks. Considering what it takes to be an inevitable, Charlie and I recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or even a Twinkling Twenty. To the inevitables in our portfolio, therefore, we add a few "highly probables."
In the letter, he refers to Coca-Cola (KO) and Gillette (now part of Procter & Gamble:PG) as "The Inevitables".
Adam
Long BRKb, KO, and PG
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Saturday, December 26, 2009
The Daily Journal
Charlie Munger has been Chairman of The Daily Journal (DJCO) since 1977 and his legal firm controls 41% of the company. It is thinly traded but is one of the few profitable news organizations. This article in TheStreet.com gives a quick overview of DJCO's success.
The Daily Journal has avoided the problems afflicting other news organizations by targeting niches, such as lawyers and readers in small communities in California. This tactic has lead to a profitable mix that capitalizes on the weak coverage of local news on the Web. The company also provides specialized information and software to courts.
The company's operating results have been phenomenal. Its return on equity of 28% and net margin of 22% leave the New York Times and Washington Post in the dust. - TheStreet.com
Daily Journal Prints Cash: Under the Radar
So the business is doing well. At least it is in the context of that industry's troubles. What I find even more interesting is that at the start of this year the company had around $ 22 million of cash and equivalents (mostly in US Treasuries). In fact, for most of the past decade the company had remained cautiously positioned with investments. Around March, approximately $ 20 million of those investments in US Treasuries were converted to common stocks. Those equity investments are now worth $ 54 million with another $ 8 million of cash on the balance sheet...and still no debt (~$ 6 million of the $ 8 million of cash currently on the balance sheet as of 9/30/09 is from FCF generated this year). So as of 9/30/09 approximately $ 62 million of the company's $ 80 million market value is represented by cash and stocks.
One could easily argue that of the great investors who've been around a while Charlie and the DJCO team have had the best year.
Also, if you think DJCO has a decent future right now...that $ 5 million+ in FCF DJCO is generating can be bought for around $ 18 million ($ 80 million market value minus $ 62 million in cash and stocks).
Slightly more than 3.5 Price/FCF. I'm guessing that the portfolio is a pretty sound one considering who is in charge. Whether the business has good future prospects is not as clear but the margin of safety appears to be there.
Adam
No position in DJCO
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
The Daily Journal has avoided the problems afflicting other news organizations by targeting niches, such as lawyers and readers in small communities in California. This tactic has lead to a profitable mix that capitalizes on the weak coverage of local news on the Web. The company also provides specialized information and software to courts.
The company's operating results have been phenomenal. Its return on equity of 28% and net margin of 22% leave the New York Times and Washington Post in the dust. - TheStreet.com
Daily Journal Prints Cash: Under the Radar
So the business is doing well. At least it is in the context of that industry's troubles. What I find even more interesting is that at the start of this year the company had around $ 22 million of cash and equivalents (mostly in US Treasuries). In fact, for most of the past decade the company had remained cautiously positioned with investments. Around March, approximately $ 20 million of those investments in US Treasuries were converted to common stocks. Those equity investments are now worth $ 54 million with another $ 8 million of cash on the balance sheet...and still no debt (~$ 6 million of the $ 8 million of cash currently on the balance sheet as of 9/30/09 is from FCF generated this year). So as of 9/30/09 approximately $ 62 million of the company's $ 80 million market value is represented by cash and stocks.
One could easily argue that of the great investors who've been around a while Charlie and the DJCO team have had the best year.
Also, if you think DJCO has a decent future right now...that $ 5 million+ in FCF DJCO is generating can be bought for around $ 18 million ($ 80 million market value minus $ 62 million in cash and stocks).
Slightly more than 3.5 Price/FCF. I'm guessing that the portfolio is a pretty sound one considering who is in charge. Whether the business has good future prospects is not as clear but the margin of safety appears to be there.
Adam
No position in DJCO
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
"Stock-Renters"
"...we have this huge amount of investors in the market or, rent-a-stock, stock-renters in the market compared to stock owners." - John Bogle on CNBC
Yesterday morning on CNBC, John Bogle referred to the following quote from John Maynard Keynes:
"Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." - John Maynard Keynes in Chapter 12 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
Bogle went on to say that one of the biggest risks going forward is what he sees as the unfortunate, and in his view very damaging triumph of speculation over investing. In the video, he goes on to say that the problem is the ongoing trend toward speculators in the market (what he calls the "stock-renters") and away from owners with long-term returns in mind (Bogle points out that the amount of speculative activity is measurably higher now than it was even in 1929).
To me, it makes sense that you end up with more price distortions in the market like we've had this past decade with so many "renters" participating. An owner of something is more likely to be grounded by intrinsic value. A renter will naturally focus on short term price movement even if that price is extremely decoupled from reality.
"Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that 'Price is what you pay; value is what you get.'" - Warren Buffett in the 2008 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter
If a larger and larger percent of market participants are not grounded in value, and instead focused on price action, doesn't it seem probable that the result will be more stocks becoming mispriced relative to intrinsic value? Would GE and Coca Cola have been selling at 50+ times earnings in the late 90's or Cisco at 100x during the internet bubble (never mind all the internet bubble stocks that made even Cisco at 100x earnings look cheap) if fewer participants were in the "stock-renting" business?
The emergence of the market technicians could be seen as cause or symptom depending on your point of view. Either way, technicians do not see any point to fundamental analysis. It's all in the charts (technical analysis is not new but it is certainly prevalent). Algorithms that are designed to profit from "ownership" of a stock for mere seconds care nothing about value. With fewer participants focused upon value the frequent and widespread mispricing of assets seems inevitable.
In Bogle's book, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, he said the following:
"When we should be teaching young students about long-term investing and the magic of compound interest, the stock-picking contests offered by our schools are in fact teaching them about short-term speculation."
Charlie Munger has expressed similar views.
"There's no reason to have a system where every young man has $ 8 billion to play with and buy whatever he wants. It's incredibly stupid. It's absolutely crazy. If I were in charge, I'd take away everything from banks that wasn't boring. Completely shut down [credit default swaps] 100%. What's the harm in this? The world worked just fine without them. We don't need an economy that resembles a vast poker tournament." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Shareholder Meeting
For me, large price distortions in the stock market has got to hurt the real economy. Some may ask when Coca-Cola* was selling at 50+ times earnings in the late 90's what's the harm? Well, significant mispricings can lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. Mispriced assets leading to misallocated capital. This might prevent, or at least delay, capital from getting somewhere else where it'd be more useful for economic development. Those misallocated dollars in Coca-Cola (or Cisco, GE, and just about any internet stock at the time), for example, might instead be used to help some entrepreneur get a good idea, in a timely way, off the ground that ultimately would create wealth and jobs.
Obviously, the problem is not that the money disappears in this example. Someone's is always on the other side of the trade. It's just a very inefficient way to do the business of capital allocation and development. You end up with certain industries overcapitalized -- maybe resulting in overcapacity/excess supply -- while others with merit don't get off the ground or are delayed.
The process becomes truly destructive is when lots of fresh capital goes into a bunch of internet startups with little merit while more useful things don't get funded sufficiently or at all.
In the late 1990s, plenty of market participants, professional or not, were buying overvalued shares of Coca-Cola, GE, Cisco. Even worse, some were buying things like Pets.com. We've also just recently experienced an enormous speculative housing bubble followed by a commodity bubble.
The markets have always been a bit manic in nature. It swings -- more than occasionally -- from excessive exuberance to excessive fear. That's not going to change.
It's just that, in its current form, it seems designed to amplify that tendency.
Adam
Long stocks mentioned
* Coca-Cola was most certainly overpriced -- selling at a price that far exceeded per share intrinsic value -- in the late 1990s. Today, at the very least Coca-Cola's intrinsic value has, give or take, caught up to its stock price.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Yesterday morning on CNBC, John Bogle referred to the following quote from John Maynard Keynes:
"Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done." - John Maynard Keynes in Chapter 12 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
Bogle went on to say that one of the biggest risks going forward is what he sees as the unfortunate, and in his view very damaging triumph of speculation over investing. In the video, he goes on to say that the problem is the ongoing trend toward speculators in the market (what he calls the "stock-renters") and away from owners with long-term returns in mind (Bogle points out that the amount of speculative activity is measurably higher now than it was even in 1929).
To me, it makes sense that you end up with more price distortions in the market like we've had this past decade with so many "renters" participating. An owner of something is more likely to be grounded by intrinsic value. A renter will naturally focus on short term price movement even if that price is extremely decoupled from reality.
"Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that 'Price is what you pay; value is what you get.'" - Warren Buffett in the 2008 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter
If a larger and larger percent of market participants are not grounded in value, and instead focused on price action, doesn't it seem probable that the result will be more stocks becoming mispriced relative to intrinsic value? Would GE and Coca Cola have been selling at 50+ times earnings in the late 90's or Cisco at 100x during the internet bubble (never mind all the internet bubble stocks that made even Cisco at 100x earnings look cheap) if fewer participants were in the "stock-renting" business?
The emergence of the market technicians could be seen as cause or symptom depending on your point of view. Either way, technicians do not see any point to fundamental analysis. It's all in the charts (technical analysis is not new but it is certainly prevalent). Algorithms that are designed to profit from "ownership" of a stock for mere seconds care nothing about value. With fewer participants focused upon value the frequent and widespread mispricing of assets seems inevitable.
In Bogle's book, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, he said the following:
"When we should be teaching young students about long-term investing and the magic of compound interest, the stock-picking contests offered by our schools are in fact teaching them about short-term speculation."
Charlie Munger has expressed similar views.
"There's no reason to have a system where every young man has $ 8 billion to play with and buy whatever he wants. It's incredibly stupid. It's absolutely crazy. If I were in charge, I'd take away everything from banks that wasn't boring. Completely shut down [credit default swaps] 100%. What's the harm in this? The world worked just fine without them. We don't need an economy that resembles a vast poker tournament." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Wesco Shareholder Meeting
For me, large price distortions in the stock market has got to hurt the real economy. Some may ask when Coca-Cola* was selling at 50+ times earnings in the late 90's what's the harm? Well, significant mispricings can lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. Mispriced assets leading to misallocated capital. This might prevent, or at least delay, capital from getting somewhere else where it'd be more useful for economic development. Those misallocated dollars in Coca-Cola (or Cisco, GE, and just about any internet stock at the time), for example, might instead be used to help some entrepreneur get a good idea, in a timely way, off the ground that ultimately would create wealth and jobs.
Obviously, the problem is not that the money disappears in this example. Someone's is always on the other side of the trade. It's just a very inefficient way to do the business of capital allocation and development. You end up with certain industries overcapitalized -- maybe resulting in overcapacity/excess supply -- while others with merit don't get off the ground or are delayed.
The process becomes truly destructive is when lots of fresh capital goes into a bunch of internet startups with little merit while more useful things don't get funded sufficiently or at all.
In the late 1990s, plenty of market participants, professional or not, were buying overvalued shares of Coca-Cola, GE, Cisco. Even worse, some were buying things like Pets.com. We've also just recently experienced an enormous speculative housing bubble followed by a commodity bubble.
The markets have always been a bit manic in nature. It swings -- more than occasionally -- from excessive exuberance to excessive fear. That's not going to change.
It's just that, in its current form, it seems designed to amplify that tendency.
Adam
Long stocks mentioned
* Coca-Cola was most certainly overpriced -- selling at a price that far exceeded per share intrinsic value -- in the late 1990s. Today, at the very least Coca-Cola's intrinsic value has, give or take, caught up to its stock price.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Stocks to Watch
Here is an update of stocks I like* for my own portfolio at the right price.
Those under the dashed line are businesses I like but prevailing prices have become too expensive. Some are just barely above but the objective should be, of course to buy them well below.
Unfortunately, most of the stocks are now below that line.
Kraft (KFT) continues to be held back by it's bid for Cadbury (CBY) so it's price has remained reasonable.
I've added NSC and MCD to the list. Neither are great bargains right now but NSC is a good alternative to BNI and MCD is one of the great global franchises. I've removed BNI from the list due to Berkshire Hathaway's pending acquisition.
As always, the stocks in bold have two things in common. They are:
1) currently owned by Berkshire Hathaway (as of 9/30/09) and,
2) selling below the price that Warren Buffett paid in the past few years.
There are several other Berkshire Hathaway holdings on this list but they don't have the 2nd thing going for them.
These are all intended to be long-term investments. A ten year horizon or longer. No trades here.
Stock/Max Price I'd Pay/Recent Price (12-16-09)
JNJ/65.00/64.80 - Buffett paid ~$ 62
KFT/30.00/27.15 - Buffett paid ~$ 33
USB/24.00/22.09 - Buffett paid ~$ 31
WFC/28.00/25.84 - Buffett paid ~$ 32
MCD/63.00/62.42
NSC/54.00/52.86
---------------------
COP/50.00/50.86 - Buffett paid ~$ 82...sold some shares at a loss
MHK/45.00/47.37
PG/60.00/62.16
PEP/60.00/60.68
KO/55.00/58.42
AXP/35.00/41.27
ADP/37.00/42.89
DEO/60.00/68.88
PM/45.00/50.08
BRKb/3000/3309
MO/16.00/19.63
LOW/19.00/23.69
HANS/30.00/36.33
PKX/80.00/128.24
RMCF/6.00/8.02
(Splits, spinoffs, and similar actions inevitably will occur going forward. Will adjust as necessary to make meaningful comparisons.)
Stocks removed from list:
In other words, I believe these are intrinsically worth quite a bit more than the max price I've indicated in this post and in prior Stocks to Watch posts. I also believe most of these companies generally have favorable long-term economics (i.e. the best of them have high and durable ROC) and, as a result, intrinsic values will increase over time. Of course, I may be wrong about the core economics and that margin of safety could provide insufficient protection against a loss. Still, a year from now I would expect to be willing to pay more for many of these based upon each company's intrinsic value growth over that time frame.
Some of these stocks have rallied quite a bit compared to not too long ago. So they're more difficult to buy with a sufficient margin of safety. Still, that doesn't mean the risk of missing something you like when a fair price is available (error of omission) won't ultimately be more costly than suffering a short-term paper loss.
Here are some thoughts on errors of omission by Warren Buffett from an article in The Motley Fool.
And also...
"During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt... Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in." - Warren Buffett's 2008 Annual Letter to Shareholders
In other words, not buying what's still attractively valued to avoid short-term paper losses is far from a perfect solution with your best long-term investment ideas.
To me, if an investment was initially bought at a fair price, and is likely to increase substantially in intrinsic value over 20 years, it makes no sense to be bothered by a temporary paper loss. Of course, make a misjudgment on the quality of a business and that paper loss becomes a real one (error of commission).
There is no perfect answer to this problem. When highly confident that a great business is available at a fair price it's important to accumulate enough while the window of opportunity exists.
Sometimes ignoring the risk of short-term losses is necessary to make sure a meaningful stake is acquired.
Adam
* This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here are never a recommendation to buy or sell anything and should never be considered specific individualized investment advice. In general, intend to remain long the above stocks (at least those that at some point became cheap enough to buy) unless market prices become significantly higher than intrinsic value, core business economics become materially impaired, prospects turn out to have been misjudged, or opportunity costs become high.
** The required margin of safety is naturally larger for a bank than for something like KO. When I make a mistake and misjudge a company's economics in a major way, the margin of safety may still not be sufficient. Judging the durability of the economics correctly matters most. If the economics remain intact but the stock goes down that is a very good thing in the long run.
Those under the dashed line are businesses I like but prevailing prices have become too expensive. Some are just barely above but the objective should be, of course to buy them well below.
Unfortunately, most of the stocks are now below that line.
Kraft (KFT) continues to be held back by it's bid for Cadbury (CBY) so it's price has remained reasonable.
I've added NSC and MCD to the list. Neither are great bargains right now but NSC is a good alternative to BNI and MCD is one of the great global franchises. I've removed BNI from the list due to Berkshire Hathaway's pending acquisition.
As always, the stocks in bold have two things in common. They are:
1) currently owned by Berkshire Hathaway (as of 9/30/09) and,
2) selling below the price that Warren Buffett paid in the past few years.
There are several other Berkshire Hathaway holdings on this list but they don't have the 2nd thing going for them.
These are all intended to be long-term investments. A ten year horizon or longer. No trades here.
Stock/Max Price I'd Pay/Recent Price (12-16-09)
JNJ/65.00/64.80 - Buffett paid ~$ 62
KFT/30.00/27.15 - Buffett paid ~$ 33
USB/24.00/22.09 - Buffett paid ~$ 31
WFC/28.00/25.84 - Buffett paid ~$ 32
MCD/63.00/62.42
NSC/54.00/52.86
---------------------
COP/50.00/50.86 - Buffett paid ~$ 82...sold some shares at a loss
MHK/45.00/47.37
PG/60.00/62.16
PEP/60.00/60.68
KO/55.00/58.42
AXP/35.00/41.27
ADP/37.00/42.89
DEO/60.00/68.88
PM/45.00/50.08
BRKb/3000/3309
MO/16.00/19.63
LOW/19.00/23.69
HANS/30.00/36.33
PKX/80.00/128.24
RMCF/6.00/8.02
(Splits, spinoffs, and similar actions inevitably will occur going forward. Will adjust as necessary to make meaningful comparisons.)
Stocks removed from list:
- BNI - I liked purchasing BNI up to $ 80/share. It was bought out by Berkshire Hathaway for $ 100/share in late 2009. Deal should close early 2010.
In other words, I believe these are intrinsically worth quite a bit more than the max price I've indicated in this post and in prior Stocks to Watch posts. I also believe most of these companies generally have favorable long-term economics (i.e. the best of them have high and durable ROC) and, as a result, intrinsic values will increase over time. Of course, I may be wrong about the core economics and that margin of safety could provide insufficient protection against a loss. Still, a year from now I would expect to be willing to pay more for many of these based upon each company's intrinsic value growth over that time frame.
Some of these stocks have rallied quite a bit compared to not too long ago. So they're more difficult to buy with a sufficient margin of safety. Still, that doesn't mean the risk of missing something you like when a fair price is available (error of omission) won't ultimately be more costly than suffering a short-term paper loss.
Here are some thoughts on errors of omission by Warren Buffett from an article in The Motley Fool.
And also...
"During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt... Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in." - Warren Buffett's 2008 Annual Letter to Shareholders
In other words, not buying what's still attractively valued to avoid short-term paper losses is far from a perfect solution with your best long-term investment ideas.
To me, if an investment was initially bought at a fair price, and is likely to increase substantially in intrinsic value over 20 years, it makes no sense to be bothered by a temporary paper loss. Of course, make a misjudgment on the quality of a business and that paper loss becomes a real one (error of commission).
There is no perfect answer to this problem. When highly confident that a great business is available at a fair price it's important to accumulate enough while the window of opportunity exists.
Sometimes ignoring the risk of short-term losses is necessary to make sure a meaningful stake is acquired.
Adam
* This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here are never a recommendation to buy or sell anything and should never be considered specific individualized investment advice. In general, intend to remain long the above stocks (at least those that at some point became cheap enough to buy) unless market prices become significantly higher than intrinsic value, core business economics become materially impaired, prospects turn out to have been misjudged, or opportunity costs become high.
** The required margin of safety is naturally larger for a bank than for something like KO. When I make a mistake and misjudge a company's economics in a major way, the margin of safety may still not be sufficient. Judging the durability of the economics correctly matters most. If the economics remain intact but the stock goes down that is a very good thing in the long run.
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
Airlines: A Tough Business
Airlines have had a fairly brutal half century or so. It has just been a difficult business to be in for a whole bunch of reasons. Here are just some of the many problems:
From an article in The Onion:
In its ongoing effort to cut transportation costs and boost profits, United Airlines announced Tuesday that it was exploring the feasibility of herding them into planes and stacking them like cordwood from floor to ceiling.
"After much trial and error, we've found the most efficient way to stack them is to start with a base of large ones, then put down a layer of medium ones, then fill up all the holes with the smaller ones," operations manager Gary Brown said. "The really tiny ones are great for cramming up in the corners."
That's, at the very least, a novel approach to solving a difficult problem.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
- Capital intensiveness
- High fixed costs resulting in excessive operating leverage
- Unpredictable fuel expenses that airlines have little control over
- Fuel expenses typically make up a substantial portion (~20-30%) of an airline's cost structure with potential spikes beyond that level
- Minimal to no pricing power
- Overcapacity
- Excessive debt (financial leverage)
From an article in The Onion:
In its ongoing effort to cut transportation costs and boost profits, United Airlines announced Tuesday that it was exploring the feasibility of herding them into planes and stacking them like cordwood from floor to ceiling.
That's, at the very least, a novel approach to solving a difficult problem.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Friday, December 11, 2009
AOL Goes Public...Again
A little less than 10 years ago AOL's market value was, unbelievably, over $ 160 billion. Once combined with Time Warner the market value of the 2 companies was over $ 300 billion.
AOL went public again today and is trading at around $ 23/share. At that price the company is currently valued at $ 2.4 billion...a 98.5% drop in value since back when it acquired Time Warner.
The funny thing is AOL may finally be fairly valued now though I certainly wouldn't touch it (At today's price AOL is probably selling at 5-6x current earnings...whether just a fraction of those earning will be around in 5 years is the question). So best case it's a cigar butt.
What a difference a decade makes.
When AOL bid to buy Time Warner who in either boardroom or within the senior leadership was thinking about Google?
From this MarketWatch article:
...few were even aware that a 70-person startup called Google had set out to show small advertisements alongside Internet search results. Just five years later, Google Inc. itself had become a heavyweight on the scene and it purchased a 5% stake in AOL from Time Warner, at a price of $1 billion. Four years after that, however, Google sold the stake back to a chastened Time Warner for $283 million, while maintaining control of the inner workings of AOL's search engine through a partnership.
Back in 2000 when AOL was valued at over $ 160 billion the company was earning approximately $ 1 billion per year giving it a PE of ~160. So, as an investor, you were paying $ 160 to buy $ 1 of earnings for a company with a suspect economic moat.
The contrast of AOL at the time with Google today is significant. Google will earn over $ 7 billion this year and is in a position to grow that substantially in coming years. So while Google's $185 billion market value is slightly higher than AOL's at the time, it's earning capacity is already 7x higher and looks more durable. It also has $ 22 billion of cash with no debt. Now that may not be cheap...but a case can certainly be made for that price in my view.
Most importantly, at least for now, Google appears to have a wide economic moat. Now whether that moat will become wider or shrink over time is much more difficult to judge considering how fast the world they operate in changes. Still, I wouldn't bet against them over the short to medium run.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
AOL went public again today and is trading at around $ 23/share. At that price the company is currently valued at $ 2.4 billion...a 98.5% drop in value since back when it acquired Time Warner.
The funny thing is AOL may finally be fairly valued now though I certainly wouldn't touch it (At today's price AOL is probably selling at 5-6x current earnings...whether just a fraction of those earning will be around in 5 years is the question). So best case it's a cigar butt.
What a difference a decade makes.
When AOL bid to buy Time Warner who in either boardroom or within the senior leadership was thinking about Google?
From this MarketWatch article:
...few were even aware that a 70-person startup called Google had set out to show small advertisements alongside Internet search results. Just five years later, Google Inc. itself had become a heavyweight on the scene and it purchased a 5% stake in AOL from Time Warner, at a price of $1 billion. Four years after that, however, Google sold the stake back to a chastened Time Warner for $283 million, while maintaining control of the inner workings of AOL's search engine through a partnership.
Back in 2000 when AOL was valued at over $ 160 billion the company was earning approximately $ 1 billion per year giving it a PE of ~160. So, as an investor, you were paying $ 160 to buy $ 1 of earnings for a company with a suspect economic moat.
The contrast of AOL at the time with Google today is significant. Google will earn over $ 7 billion this year and is in a position to grow that substantially in coming years. So while Google's $185 billion market value is slightly higher than AOL's at the time, it's earning capacity is already 7x higher and looks more durable. It also has $ 22 billion of cash with no debt. Now that may not be cheap...but a case can certainly be made for that price in my view.
Most importantly, at least for now, Google appears to have a wide economic moat. Now whether that moat will become wider or shrink over time is much more difficult to judge considering how fast the world they operate in changes. Still, I wouldn't bet against them over the short to medium run.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
$ 2 Million -----> $ 2 Trillion
The following are excerpts from Charlie Munger's Turning $ 2 Million into $ 2 Trillion.
It is 1884 in Atlanta. You are brought, along with twenty others like you, before a rich and eccentric Atlanta citizen named Glotz.
Effectively, it is an explanation of psychological factors and other forces that helped to make the Coca-Cola Company what it is.
Glotz offers to invest $2 million, yet take only half the equity, for a Glotz charitable foundation, in a new corporation organized to go into the non-alcoholic beverage business and remain in that business only, forever. Glotz wants to use a name that has somehow charmed him: Coca-Cola.
The other half of the new corporation's equity will go to the man who most plausibly demonstrates that his business plan will cause Glotz's foundation to be worth a trillion dollars 150 years later, in the money of that later time, 2034, despite paying out a large part of its earnings each year as a dividend. This will make the whole new corporation worth $2 trillion, even after paying out many billions of dollars in dividends.
You have fifteen minutes to make your pitch. What do you say to Glotz?
And here is my solution, my pitch to Glotz, using only the helpful notions and what every bright college sophomore should know.
Check out the full post to see Charlie's approach.
Adam
Munger: Practical Thought About Practical Thought?
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
It is 1884 in Atlanta. You are brought, along with twenty others like you, before a rich and eccentric Atlanta citizen named Glotz.
Effectively, it is an explanation of psychological factors and other forces that helped to make the Coca-Cola Company what it is.
Glotz offers to invest $2 million, yet take only half the equity, for a Glotz charitable foundation, in a new corporation organized to go into the non-alcoholic beverage business and remain in that business only, forever. Glotz wants to use a name that has somehow charmed him: Coca-Cola.
The other half of the new corporation's equity will go to the man who most plausibly demonstrates that his business plan will cause Glotz's foundation to be worth a trillion dollars 150 years later, in the money of that later time, 2034, despite paying out a large part of its earnings each year as a dividend. This will make the whole new corporation worth $2 trillion, even after paying out many billions of dollars in dividends.
You have fifteen minutes to make your pitch. What do you say to Glotz?
And here is my solution, my pitch to Glotz, using only the helpful notions and what every bright college sophomore should know.
Check out the full post to see Charlie's approach.
Adam
Munger: Practical Thought About Practical Thought?
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Ackman on McDonald's
One of the great global franchise businesses is McDonald's (MCD). Yesterday, they reported some disappointing same store sales results for November. While that indicates some problems in the short run, I don't think it changes the long-term attractiveness of the business (though the news has the potential to bring the stock into a more attractive valuation range).
MCD has solid returns on capital that will likely improve over time and a durable wide moat.
Below is an excerpt of Bill Ackman's (Pershing Square Capital Management) recent take on MCD from his 2Q09 letter:
McDonald's makes money in principally two ways: first, by collecting an approximate 14%+ share of its franchisees' revenues for the use of McDonald’s brand...and second, by generating operating profits from a portfolio of company-operated stores.
Then later added...
McDonald's brand royalty business is one of the greatest businesses in the world because it generates an annuity-like revenue stream which can grow without the requirement for meaningful investment of capital from the company. Because the company's revenue share comes from more than 32,000 different stores spread around the globe, it is an inherently stable, currency-hedged, inflation-protected stream of cash flow.
Despite its business quality and dominant global market position, McDonald's stock trades at only about 13 times multiple of 2010 earnings, a price which we believe does not adequately reflect the company’s fair value.
MCD has attractive long-term prospects and a reasonable valuation (reasonable but certainly not cheap). It's currently selling at around $ 60/share and should earn at least $ 4.30/share in 2010. As far as global franchises go I still prefer the likes of Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Diageo but McDonald's should do very well in the coming decades.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
MCD has solid returns on capital that will likely improve over time and a durable wide moat.
Below is an excerpt of Bill Ackman's (Pershing Square Capital Management) recent take on MCD from his 2Q09 letter:
McDonald's makes money in principally two ways: first, by collecting an approximate 14%+ share of its franchisees' revenues for the use of McDonald’s brand...and second, by generating operating profits from a portfolio of company-operated stores.
Then later added...
McDonald's brand royalty business is one of the greatest businesses in the world because it generates an annuity-like revenue stream which can grow without the requirement for meaningful investment of capital from the company. Because the company's revenue share comes from more than 32,000 different stores spread around the globe, it is an inherently stable, currency-hedged, inflation-protected stream of cash flow.
Despite its business quality and dominant global market position, McDonald's stock trades at only about 13 times multiple of 2010 earnings, a price which we believe does not adequately reflect the company’s fair value.
MCD has attractive long-term prospects and a reasonable valuation (reasonable but certainly not cheap). It's currently selling at around $ 60/share and should earn at least $ 4.30/share in 2010. As far as global franchises go I still prefer the likes of Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Diageo but McDonald's should do very well in the coming decades.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Investor Intelligence
Good post on two studies that reveal patterns of poor decision-making by what would generally be considered intelligent and informed investors.
The title of the post: Intelligence Can Seriously Damage Your Wealth
From the post:
"An eye-opening study on how investors choose index funds – Why Does The Law of One Price Fail? – selected a bunch of exceedingly bright people as its subjects, most being in the 98th and 99th percentiles of US SAT scores: to summarise, these people are pretty damn smart by normal standards. Moreover the participants were also decently incentivised to succeed at the investment task – which was to select the highest performing portfolio of S&P500 index funds.
Now, a moment's consideration will show that the only real differences between one S&P500 index tracker and another are the fees they charge. Therefore the optimum portfolio choice should be one that selects the minimum fee fund. It's simply not that tricky a decision. Anyway, as you can guess, the über-smart respondents conclusively proved that being the brightest of the brightest is no defence..."
The post also added this:
"The dumber investors did better than the smarter ones because they didn't understand enough about what they were doing to be fooled into doing completely the wrong thing. Brain hurting yet?"
And in a separate study...
Doran, Peterson and Wright carried out a study on finance professors, looking at their investment behaviour.
Obviously we're talking here about a group of people who should have a decent understanding of the way markets work and of the theories behind them. What we find, however, is the usual mix of confusion between ostensible beliefs and actual behaviour: basically as a group the professors behave in much same behaviourally muddled way as everyone else.
When it comes to the investment process, the right temperament and an awareness of limits matters more than extraordinary intelligence.
I think the example of Isaac Newton and the South Sea Bubble makes that pretty clear.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
The title of the post: Intelligence Can Seriously Damage Your Wealth
From the post:
"An eye-opening study on how investors choose index funds – Why Does The Law of One Price Fail? – selected a bunch of exceedingly bright people as its subjects, most being in the 98th and 99th percentiles of US SAT scores: to summarise, these people are pretty damn smart by normal standards. Moreover the participants were also decently incentivised to succeed at the investment task – which was to select the highest performing portfolio of S&P500 index funds.
Now, a moment's consideration will show that the only real differences between one S&P500 index tracker and another are the fees they charge. Therefore the optimum portfolio choice should be one that selects the minimum fee fund. It's simply not that tricky a decision. Anyway, as you can guess, the über-smart respondents conclusively proved that being the brightest of the brightest is no defence..."
The post also added this:
"The dumber investors did better than the smarter ones because they didn't understand enough about what they were doing to be fooled into doing completely the wrong thing. Brain hurting yet?"
And in a separate study...
Doran, Peterson and Wright carried out a study on finance professors, looking at their investment behaviour.
Obviously we're talking here about a group of people who should have a decent understanding of the way markets work and of the theories behind them. What we find, however, is the usual mix of confusion between ostensible beliefs and actual behaviour: basically as a group the professors behave in much same behaviourally muddled way as everyone else.
When it comes to the investment process, the right temperament and an awareness of limits matters more than extraordinary intelligence.
I think the example of Isaac Newton and the South Sea Bubble makes that pretty clear.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Psychology of Human Misjudgment
This is from a talk given by Munger at Harvard in 1995 on the subject of human misjudgment and the system of psychology that Munger came up with to better understand it.
Not a short or easy read but worth it.
Excerpt:
Although I am very interested in the subject of human misjudgment - and lord knows I've created a good bit of it - I don't think I've created my full statistical share, and I think that one of the reasons why I tried to do something about this terrible ignorance I left the Harvard Law School with.
When I saw this patterned irrationality, which was so extreme, and I had no theory or anything to deal with it, but I could see that it was extreme, and I could see that it was patterned, I just started to create my own system of psychology, partly by casual reading, but largely from personal experience, and I used that pattern to help me get through life. Fairly late in life I stumbled into this book, Influence, by a psychologist named Bob Cialdini.... Well, it's an academic book aimed at a popular audience that filled in a lot of holes in my crude system. In those holes it filled in, I thought I had a system that was a good-working tool, and I'd like to share that one with you.
And I came here because of behavioral economics. How could economics not be behavioral? If it isn't behavioral, what the hell is it? And I think it's fairly clear that all reality has to respect all other reality. If you come to inconsistencies, they have to be resolved, and so if there's anything valid in psychology, economics has to recognize it, and vice versa. So I think the people that are working on this fringe between economics and psychology are absolutely right to be there, and I think there's been plenty wrong over the years.
In this talk Charlie Munger goes through more than 20 different standard causes of human misjudgment. He updated them in Poor Charlie's Almanac. The update is organized around 25 different psychology-based tendencies.
Considering the length of the original talk I happened to choose an excerpt from the 5th standard cause:
Where you see in business just perfectly horrible results from psychologically-rooted tendencies is in accounting. If you take Westinghouse, which blew, what, two or three billion dollars pre-tax at least loaning developers to build hotels, and virtually 100% loans? Now you say any idiot knows that if there's one thing you don't like it's a developer, and another you don't like it's a hotel. And to make a 100% loan to a developer who's going to build a hotel...[Laughter] But this guy, he probably was an engineer or something, and he didn't take psychology any more than I did, and he got out there in the hands of these salesmen operating under their version of incentive-caused bias*, where any damned way of getting Westinghouse to do it was considered normal business, and they just blew it.
That would never have been possible if the accounting system hadn't been such but for the initial phase of every transaction it showed wonderful financial results. So people who have loose accounting standards are just inviting perfectly horrible behavior in other people. And it's a sin, it's an absolute sin. If you carry bushel baskets full of money through the ghetto, and made it easy to steal, that would be a considerable human sin, because you'd be causing a lot of bad behavior, and the bad behavior would spread. Similarly an institution that gets sloppy accounting commits a real human sin, and it's also a dumb way to do business, as Westinghouse has so wonderfully proved.
Oddly enough nobody mentions, at least nobody I've seen, what happened with Joe Jett and Kidder Peabody. The truth of the matter is the accounting system was such that by punching a few buttons, the Joe Jetts of the world could show profits, and profits that showed up in things that resulted in rewards and esteem and every other thing... Well the Joe Jetts are always with us, and they're not really to blame, in my judgment at least. But that bastard who created that foolish accounting system who, so far as I know, has not been flayed alive, ought to be.
The updated written version found in Poor Charlie's Almanac is also called The Psychology of Human Misjudgment. It is much more formal and organized than the original talk.
Adam
* Incentive-Caused Bias is the title of another one of the standard causes of human misjudgment covered in another section of his talk...these psychological tendencies all interact.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Not a short or easy read but worth it.
Excerpt:
Although I am very interested in the subject of human misjudgment - and lord knows I've created a good bit of it - I don't think I've created my full statistical share, and I think that one of the reasons why I tried to do something about this terrible ignorance I left the Harvard Law School with.
When I saw this patterned irrationality, which was so extreme, and I had no theory or anything to deal with it, but I could see that it was extreme, and I could see that it was patterned, I just started to create my own system of psychology, partly by casual reading, but largely from personal experience, and I used that pattern to help me get through life. Fairly late in life I stumbled into this book, Influence, by a psychologist named Bob Cialdini.... Well, it's an academic book aimed at a popular audience that filled in a lot of holes in my crude system. In those holes it filled in, I thought I had a system that was a good-working tool, and I'd like to share that one with you.
And I came here because of behavioral economics. How could economics not be behavioral? If it isn't behavioral, what the hell is it? And I think it's fairly clear that all reality has to respect all other reality. If you come to inconsistencies, they have to be resolved, and so if there's anything valid in psychology, economics has to recognize it, and vice versa. So I think the people that are working on this fringe between economics and psychology are absolutely right to be there, and I think there's been plenty wrong over the years.
In this talk Charlie Munger goes through more than 20 different standard causes of human misjudgment. He updated them in Poor Charlie's Almanac. The update is organized around 25 different psychology-based tendencies.
Considering the length of the original talk I happened to choose an excerpt from the 5th standard cause:
Where you see in business just perfectly horrible results from psychologically-rooted tendencies is in accounting. If you take Westinghouse, which blew, what, two or three billion dollars pre-tax at least loaning developers to build hotels, and virtually 100% loans? Now you say any idiot knows that if there's one thing you don't like it's a developer, and another you don't like it's a hotel. And to make a 100% loan to a developer who's going to build a hotel...[Laughter] But this guy, he probably was an engineer or something, and he didn't take psychology any more than I did, and he got out there in the hands of these salesmen operating under their version of incentive-caused bias*, where any damned way of getting Westinghouse to do it was considered normal business, and they just blew it.
That would never have been possible if the accounting system hadn't been such but for the initial phase of every transaction it showed wonderful financial results. So people who have loose accounting standards are just inviting perfectly horrible behavior in other people. And it's a sin, it's an absolute sin. If you carry bushel baskets full of money through the ghetto, and made it easy to steal, that would be a considerable human sin, because you'd be causing a lot of bad behavior, and the bad behavior would spread. Similarly an institution that gets sloppy accounting commits a real human sin, and it's also a dumb way to do business, as Westinghouse has so wonderfully proved.
Oddly enough nobody mentions, at least nobody I've seen, what happened with Joe Jett and Kidder Peabody. The truth of the matter is the accounting system was such that by punching a few buttons, the Joe Jetts of the world could show profits, and profits that showed up in things that resulted in rewards and esteem and every other thing... Well the Joe Jetts are always with us, and they're not really to blame, in my judgment at least. But that bastard who created that foolish accounting system who, so far as I know, has not been flayed alive, ought to be.
The updated written version found in Poor Charlie's Almanac is also called The Psychology of Human Misjudgment. It is much more formal and organized than the original talk.
Adam
* Incentive-Caused Bias is the title of another one of the standard causes of human misjudgment covered in another section of his talk...these psychological tendencies all interact.
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Six Stock Portfolio Update
Portfolio performance since mentioning on April 9, 2009 that I like these six stocks as long-term investments if bought near prevailing prices at that time (or lower, of course).
While I never make stock recommendations each of these, at the right price, are what I consider attractive long-term investments for my own capital.
Stock|% Change*
WFC|+50.1%
DEO|+48.5%
PM |+25.4%
PEP |+18.6%
LOW|+8.2%
AXP|+137.0%
Total return for the six stocks combined is 48.03% (excluding dividends) since April 9th. The S&P 500 is up 29.95% since that date. This is a conservative calculation of returns based upon the average price of each security on the date mentioned. Better market prices were available in subsequent days so total returns could have been improved with some careful accumulation.
The purpose here is not to measure returns over short time frames. It's meant to be an easy to verify working example of Newton's 4th Law.
Many equity investors would get improved long-term returns, at lower risk, if they: 1) bought (at fair or better than fair prices) shares in 5-10 great businesses, 2) avoided the hyperactive trading ethos that is so popular these days to minimize mistakes & frictional costs, and 3) sold shares in these businesses only if the core long-term economics become impaired or opportunity costs are extremely high.
A six stock portfolio is very concentrated but vast diversification isn't always needed. I've noted this in a previous post.
"We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it." - Warren Buffett in the 1993 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter
Having said that...the less experienced you are as an investor the more diversification may be a necessity. Those that fall into this group probably need to diversify holdings more but still keep trading and frictional costs to a minimum. Index funds may make more sense than buying individual stocks. It's important to know which camp you fall into before investing a penny.
The above concentrated portfolio of six stocks won't outperform in every period. In the long run it has a reasonable probability of doing well compared to the S&P 500 due to lower frictional costs and the quality of the businesses. The growth in value comes from the intrinsic value created by the businesses themselves...not some special aptitude for trading or timing the market. It probably won't outperform the very best portfolio managers but should do very well against many mutual funds** over a period of 10 years or longer.
In any case, this simple experiment is designed so it's easy for anyone to check the results. If this six stock portfolio*** isn't performing well against the S&P 500 (it'll take a few years, at least, to meaningfully start judging performance) it will be obvious.
Finally, an opportunity may come along where the capital from one of these stocks is needed.
My view is under such a scenario the threshold for making changes needs to be high. That hypothetical new investment must have clearly superior economics.
In addition, if something appears to fundamentally threaten the moat (ie. the effect of the internet on the newspaper biz) of one of these businesses a change may also be warranted.
So I may rarely add or switch some of the stocks in this portfolio but I will only make a change if the situation described above exists (ie. if the core long-term economics of one of these stocks become impaired or opportunity costs are extremely high).
Adam
Long position in DEO, AXP, PEP, PM, WFC, and LOW
* As of 11/30/09.
** There's no shortage of evidence that many actively managed equity mutual funds underperform the S&P 500. Also, DALBAR's Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) study released in March 2009 revealed that over the past 20 years investors in stock mutual funds have underperformed the S&P 500 by 6.5% a year (8.35% vs. 1.87%). Beyond the performance of the funds themselves, it shows that much of these poor returns come down to investor behavior. The tendency of investors to buy the hot mutual fund that has been going up while selling when the market is going down out of panic or fear (the same is true for stocks).
*** I don't think these are necessarily the six best businesses in the world, but I believe they are all very good businesses that were selling at reasonable prices on April 9th. At any moment, there is always something better to own in theory but I don't think you can invest that way (as if stocks are baseball cards) and have consistent success. So there are certainly quite a few other shares in businesses that would be good alternatives to these six. The point is for me to get a handful of them at a fair price and then let time work.
----------
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here are never a recommendation to buy or sell anything and should never be considered specific individualized investment advice. In general, intend to be long the positions noted unless they sell significantly above intrinsic value, core business economics become materially impaired, prospects turn out to have been misjudged, or opportunity costs become high.
While I never make stock recommendations each of these, at the right price, are what I consider attractive long-term investments for my own capital.
Stock|% Change*
WFC|+50.1%
DEO|+48.5%
PM |+25.4%
PEP |+18.6%
LOW|+8.2%
AXP|+137.0%
Total return for the six stocks combined is 48.03% (excluding dividends) since April 9th. The S&P 500 is up 29.95% since that date. This is a conservative calculation of returns based upon the average price of each security on the date mentioned. Better market prices were available in subsequent days so total returns could have been improved with some careful accumulation.
The purpose here is not to measure returns over short time frames. It's meant to be an easy to verify working example of Newton's 4th Law.
Many equity investors would get improved long-term returns, at lower risk, if they: 1) bought (at fair or better than fair prices) shares in 5-10 great businesses, 2) avoided the hyperactive trading ethos that is so popular these days to minimize mistakes & frictional costs, and 3) sold shares in these businesses only if the core long-term economics become impaired or opportunity costs are extremely high.
A six stock portfolio is very concentrated but vast diversification isn't always needed. I've noted this in a previous post.
"We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it." - Warren Buffett in the 1993 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter
Having said that...the less experienced you are as an investor the more diversification may be a necessity. Those that fall into this group probably need to diversify holdings more but still keep trading and frictional costs to a minimum. Index funds may make more sense than buying individual stocks. It's important to know which camp you fall into before investing a penny.
The above concentrated portfolio of six stocks won't outperform in every period. In the long run it has a reasonable probability of doing well compared to the S&P 500 due to lower frictional costs and the quality of the businesses. The growth in value comes from the intrinsic value created by the businesses themselves...not some special aptitude for trading or timing the market. It probably won't outperform the very best portfolio managers but should do very well against many mutual funds** over a period of 10 years or longer.
In any case, this simple experiment is designed so it's easy for anyone to check the results. If this six stock portfolio*** isn't performing well against the S&P 500 (it'll take a few years, at least, to meaningfully start judging performance) it will be obvious.
Finally, an opportunity may come along where the capital from one of these stocks is needed.
My view is under such a scenario the threshold for making changes needs to be high. That hypothetical new investment must have clearly superior economics.
In addition, if something appears to fundamentally threaten the moat (ie. the effect of the internet on the newspaper biz) of one of these businesses a change may also be warranted.
So I may rarely add or switch some of the stocks in this portfolio but I will only make a change if the situation described above exists (ie. if the core long-term economics of one of these stocks become impaired or opportunity costs are extremely high).
Adam
Long position in DEO, AXP, PEP, PM, WFC, and LOW
* As of 11/30/09.
** There's no shortage of evidence that many actively managed equity mutual funds underperform the S&P 500. Also, DALBAR's Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) study released in March 2009 revealed that over the past 20 years investors in stock mutual funds have underperformed the S&P 500 by 6.5% a year (8.35% vs. 1.87%). Beyond the performance of the funds themselves, it shows that much of these poor returns come down to investor behavior. The tendency of investors to buy the hot mutual fund that has been going up while selling when the market is going down out of panic or fear (the same is true for stocks).
*** I don't think these are necessarily the six best businesses in the world, but I believe they are all very good businesses that were selling at reasonable prices on April 9th. At any moment, there is always something better to own in theory but I don't think you can invest that way (as if stocks are baseball cards) and have consistent success. So there are certainly quite a few other shares in businesses that would be good alternatives to these six. The point is for me to get a handful of them at a fair price and then let time work.
----------
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here are never a recommendation to buy or sell anything and should never be considered specific individualized investment advice. In general, intend to be long the positions noted unless they sell significantly above intrinsic value, core business economics become materially impaired, prospects turn out to have been misjudged, or opportunity costs become high.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Venture Capital
This BusinessWeek article on venture capital describes why the process of capital formation and nurturing of new ideas is not working as well as it should or it has in the past. Historically, venture capital in the United States has helped us to be very good at the creative part of the creative-destruction process.
It's my view that all the energy that is put into things like proprietary trading and other related non-productive financial activities is damaging to the US. It saps energy and talent away from the higher calling of matching dollars with good ideas to support innovation and entrepreneurship.
Well venture capital is definitely not one of those non-productive financial activities. We need more of it done well and a whole lot less pure speculation and gambling.
Unfortunately, according to the article, venture capital is not working all that well these days.
Some excerpts from the article:
"In the era of the financialization of everything, corporate and public pension funds got in the game."
"Since institutional investors are under pressure to show short-term returns, VC funds are trying to keep them as investors by going for maximum liquidity, creating early payoffs via premature 'exits' (selling some startups in their portfolios within three years, say). Instead of working to make their best startups strong and independent, they're 'flipping' them..."
"In other words, today the traditional VC fee structure promotes haste in putting money to work rather than skill in developing new enterprises..."
The article closed by saying...
"History attests to the importance of capital sources willing to fund unknown companies exploring uncertain innovations. The sooner we revitalize the stale relationship between VC funds and their investors, the sooner the industry can again support America's entrepreneurs."
So venture capital isn't working very well and Wall Street's brightest expend all kinds of energy on things like prop trading instead of using that same energy in more useful ways. In his most recent letter, Jeremy Grantham noted the following:
"As we ponder the problem of prop trading, let us consider Goldman's stunning $3 billion second quarter profit. It appeared to be almost all hedge fund trading."
Things like less than effective venture capital process and too much emphasis on prop trading is a net loss for the US and, at least, partly explains some of our current problems. It comes down to poor allocation of capital and other resources. When capital is poorly allocated there might be a non-sustainable economic "sugar high" while better ideas goes unfunded or gets underfunded (think of all those "dot-bombs"). Long-term, this reduces wealth and living standards.
More from Grantham's letter:
"...it is worth remembering that every valued job created by financial complexity is paid for by the rest of the real economy, and talent is displaced from real production, as symbolized by all of the nuclear physicists on prop trading desks. Viewed from the perspective of the long-term well-being of the whole economy, the drastic expansion of the U.S. financial system as a percentage of total GDP in the last 20 years has been a drain on the health and cost structure of the balance of the real economy."
Whether it is the current state of venture capital as described in the Businessweek article, prop trading or other related non-productive financial activities, the world would better off if incentives/disincentives were put in place to change the balance. The brainpower being utilized to develop complex trading schemes could certainly be better utilized elsewhere.
Let's just say it's a good thing Brin and Page didn't go to a hedge fund.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
It's my view that all the energy that is put into things like proprietary trading and other related non-productive financial activities is damaging to the US. It saps energy and talent away from the higher calling of matching dollars with good ideas to support innovation and entrepreneurship.
Well venture capital is definitely not one of those non-productive financial activities. We need more of it done well and a whole lot less pure speculation and gambling.
Unfortunately, according to the article, venture capital is not working all that well these days.
Some excerpts from the article:
"In the era of the financialization of everything, corporate and public pension funds got in the game."
"Since institutional investors are under pressure to show short-term returns, VC funds are trying to keep them as investors by going for maximum liquidity, creating early payoffs via premature 'exits' (selling some startups in their portfolios within three years, say). Instead of working to make their best startups strong and independent, they're 'flipping' them..."
"In other words, today the traditional VC fee structure promotes haste in putting money to work rather than skill in developing new enterprises..."
The article closed by saying...
"History attests to the importance of capital sources willing to fund unknown companies exploring uncertain innovations. The sooner we revitalize the stale relationship between VC funds and their investors, the sooner the industry can again support America's entrepreneurs."
So venture capital isn't working very well and Wall Street's brightest expend all kinds of energy on things like prop trading instead of using that same energy in more useful ways. In his most recent letter, Jeremy Grantham noted the following:
"As we ponder the problem of prop trading, let us consider Goldman's stunning $3 billion second quarter profit. It appeared to be almost all hedge fund trading."
Things like less than effective venture capital process and too much emphasis on prop trading is a net loss for the US and, at least, partly explains some of our current problems. It comes down to poor allocation of capital and other resources. When capital is poorly allocated there might be a non-sustainable economic "sugar high" while better ideas goes unfunded or gets underfunded (think of all those "dot-bombs"). Long-term, this reduces wealth and living standards.
More from Grantham's letter:
"...it is worth remembering that every valued job created by financial complexity is paid for by the rest of the real economy, and talent is displaced from real production, as symbolized by all of the nuclear physicists on prop trading desks. Viewed from the perspective of the long-term well-being of the whole economy, the drastic expansion of the U.S. financial system as a percentage of total GDP in the last 20 years has been a drain on the health and cost structure of the balance of the real economy."
Whether it is the current state of venture capital as described in the Businessweek article, prop trading or other related non-productive financial activities, the world would better off if incentives/disincentives were put in place to change the balance. The brainpower being utilized to develop complex trading schemes could certainly be better utilized elsewhere.
Let's just say it's a good thing Brin and Page didn't go to a hedge fund.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Confirmation Bias
Here is an article by Jason Zweig in the Wall Street Journal on the effects of 'confirmation bias' on investing behavior.
An excerpt:
"...your own mind acts like a compulsive yes-man who echoes whatever you want to believe. Psychologists call this mental gremlin the 'confirmation bias.' A recent analysis of psychological studies with nearly 8,000 participants concluded that people are twice as likely to seek information that confirms what they already believe as they are to consider evidence that would challenge those beliefs."
The article goes on to suggest ways to combat the tendency.
Learning to manage it is not an easy thing to do but well worth the trouble.
It starts with a disciplined investment process. An example of a useful rule to put in place is to spend at least as much if not more time reading -- and carefully considering -- opposing views on any investment. This can be a more difficult habit to develop than it sounds. Most of us prefer to read things that reinforce our own thinking.
"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself -- and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard Feynman
In other words, not only do you need to learn to know when to go against the prevailing wisdom of others, it's just as important to know how to challenge your own prevailing wisdom.
This can prove useful -- if implemented the right way -- beyond the world of investing.
Check out the full article.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
An excerpt:
"...your own mind acts like a compulsive yes-man who echoes whatever you want to believe. Psychologists call this mental gremlin the 'confirmation bias.' A recent analysis of psychological studies with nearly 8,000 participants concluded that people are twice as likely to seek information that confirms what they already believe as they are to consider evidence that would challenge those beliefs."
The article goes on to suggest ways to combat the tendency.
Learning to manage it is not an easy thing to do but well worth the trouble.
It starts with a disciplined investment process. An example of a useful rule to put in place is to spend at least as much if not more time reading -- and carefully considering -- opposing views on any investment. This can be a more difficult habit to develop than it sounds. Most of us prefer to read things that reinforce our own thinking.
"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself -- and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard Feynman
In other words, not only do you need to learn to know when to go against the prevailing wisdom of others, it's just as important to know how to challenge your own prevailing wisdom.
This can prove useful -- if implemented the right way -- beyond the world of investing.
Check out the full article.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Berkshire Hathaway 3rd Quarter 2009 13F-HR
In yesterday's Berkshire Hathaway 13F-HR filing some meaningful changes to the $ 61 billion equity portfolio were disclosed:
- Nearly doubled exposure to Wal-Mart
Value of Holding = ~$ 2 billion (9th largest holding)
- Continued to add to Wells Fargo investment
Value of Holding = ~$ 8.8 billion (2nd largest holding in the portfolio after Coca-Cola.)
- Established new position in Exxon Mobil
Value of Holding = ~$ 100 million (Within the context of a $ 61 billion portfolio...pretty small.)
- Established new position in Nestle
Value of Holding = ~$ 161 million (Again...relatively small.)
Buffett now has exposure to every major global confectionary company except Hershey. His investments in this area include: Mars-Wrigley, Kraft-Cadbury (assuming the deal happens), and Nestle. Guess he likes the chocolate and gum biz.
- Established small new position in Republic Services
Value of Holding = ~$ 101 million
- Continued to reduce exposure to ConocoPhillips
Value of Holding = ~$ 3.1 billion (Still the 7th largest holding. Though a position in Exxon was established...ConocoPhillips remains a 30x bigger investment.)
It will be interesting to see how this changes in the coming quarters. So far approximately 1/3 of the shares in ConocoPhillips have been trimmed since the beginning of the year. Buffett announced earlier this year they would be selling a portion of the ConocoPhillips shares at a loss for tax reasons as explained in this news release.
We sold 13.7 million shares of ConocoPhillips during the first quarter and additional shares were sold subsequent to the end of the quarter. Although we expect the market price of ConocoPhillips to increase over time to levels that exceed our original cost, we are likely to sell some additional shares prior to that time and generate additional capital losses that we can carry back to prior tax years when we generated net capital gains. - Berkshire Hathaway News Release
- Reduced exposure to Moody's
Value of Holding = ~$ 900 million (still a medium size position but it appears Buffett is committed to steadily reducing exposure to Moody's.)
There are several other minor changes to the portfolio including: establishing a very small new position in Travelers, completely selling out of small positions in Eaton and Wabco, selling almost all shares of Ingersoll-Rand, and a small reduction in exposure to Suntrust.
Adam
Long positions in Berkshire Hathaway, Wells Fargo, and Moody's.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
- Nearly doubled exposure to Wal-Mart
Value of Holding = ~$ 2 billion (9th largest holding)
- Continued to add to Wells Fargo investment
Value of Holding = ~$ 8.8 billion (2nd largest holding in the portfolio after Coca-Cola.)
- Established new position in Exxon Mobil
Value of Holding = ~$ 100 million (Within the context of a $ 61 billion portfolio...pretty small.)
- Established new position in Nestle
Value of Holding = ~$ 161 million (Again...relatively small.)
Buffett now has exposure to every major global confectionary company except Hershey. His investments in this area include: Mars-Wrigley, Kraft-Cadbury (assuming the deal happens), and Nestle. Guess he likes the chocolate and gum biz.
- Established small new position in Republic Services
Value of Holding = ~$ 101 million
- Continued to reduce exposure to ConocoPhillips
Value of Holding = ~$ 3.1 billion (Still the 7th largest holding. Though a position in Exxon was established...ConocoPhillips remains a 30x bigger investment.)
It will be interesting to see how this changes in the coming quarters. So far approximately 1/3 of the shares in ConocoPhillips have been trimmed since the beginning of the year. Buffett announced earlier this year they would be selling a portion of the ConocoPhillips shares at a loss for tax reasons as explained in this news release.
We sold 13.7 million shares of ConocoPhillips during the first quarter and additional shares were sold subsequent to the end of the quarter. Although we expect the market price of ConocoPhillips to increase over time to levels that exceed our original cost, we are likely to sell some additional shares prior to that time and generate additional capital losses that we can carry back to prior tax years when we generated net capital gains. - Berkshire Hathaway News Release
- Reduced exposure to Moody's
Value of Holding = ~$ 900 million (still a medium size position but it appears Buffett is committed to steadily reducing exposure to Moody's.)
There are several other minor changes to the portfolio including: establishing a very small new position in Travelers, completely selling out of small positions in Eaton and Wabco, selling almost all shares of Ingersoll-Rand, and a small reduction in exposure to Suntrust.
Adam
Long positions in Berkshire Hathaway, Wells Fargo, and Moody's.
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Academic Inertia
"Never underestimate the power of a dominant academic idea to choke off competing ideas, and never underestimate the unwillingness of academics to change their views in the face of evidence." - Jeremy Grantham in the 4Q 2008 Quarterly Letter
Monday, November 16, 2009
Kraft and Cadbury
Here is a good article on economic moats.
First, it references a quote from this column in The Economist on the Kraft-Cadbury deal.
Chocolate companies as a breed also have a peculiarly intimate relationship with their customers, partly because chocolate is involved in so many childhood, romantic and festive rituals, and partly because people acquire their tastes in chocolate at their mothers’ knees. Most Britons would rather eat scorpions than Hershey bars. - The Economist
And here are some excerpts from the article itself.
This illustrates how powerful and valuable brands can be. Many parts of the world are currently unfamiliar with chocolate and are "blank slates" in terms of forming brand awareness. As The Economist article points out, the first mover in those countries is likely to build brand loyalty that will be difficult or impossible to displace. Furthermore, since chocolate is a low priced luxury item, the millions of upwardly mobile consumers in developing countries will find it increasingly easy to afford the product.
...Kraft management obviously believes that Cadbury's existing distribution system in places like India will create a powerful economic moat and end up justifying the valuation.
Recently, I posted this on the power of consumer franchises.
...an established consumer franchise with pricing power (and, as a result, superior returns on capital) can use the extra cash coming in to build stronger distribution and buy more advertising. Over time that stronger distribution and bigger ad budget reinforces the strength the of the brand(s) and widens the moat. It's more generic competition with lower margins can't afford to invest as many $'s in product, distribution, and advertising so over time the gap tends to widen. The interplay of these forces makes most of the larger consumer franchises nearly impossible to displace.
As an investment model, looking for businesses with the above characteristics that are selling at reasonable prices is not a bad place to start.
Adam
Long position in KFT
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
First, it references a quote from this column in The Economist on the Kraft-Cadbury deal.
Chocolate companies as a breed also have a peculiarly intimate relationship with their customers, partly because chocolate is involved in so many childhood, romantic and festive rituals, and partly because people acquire their tastes in chocolate at their mothers’ knees. Most Britons would rather eat scorpions than Hershey bars. - The Economist
And here are some excerpts from the article itself.
This illustrates how powerful and valuable brands can be. Many parts of the world are currently unfamiliar with chocolate and are "blank slates" in terms of forming brand awareness. As The Economist article points out, the first mover in those countries is likely to build brand loyalty that will be difficult or impossible to displace. Furthermore, since chocolate is a low priced luxury item, the millions of upwardly mobile consumers in developing countries will find it increasingly easy to afford the product.
...Kraft management obviously believes that Cadbury's existing distribution system in places like India will create a powerful economic moat and end up justifying the valuation.
Recently, I posted this on the power of consumer franchises.
...an established consumer franchise with pricing power (and, as a result, superior returns on capital) can use the extra cash coming in to build stronger distribution and buy more advertising. Over time that stronger distribution and bigger ad budget reinforces the strength the of the brand(s) and widens the moat. It's more generic competition with lower margins can't afford to invest as many $'s in product, distribution, and advertising so over time the gap tends to widen. The interplay of these forces makes most of the larger consumer franchises nearly impossible to displace.
As an investment model, looking for businesses with the above characteristics that are selling at reasonable prices is not a bad place to start.
Adam
Long position in KFT
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Friday, November 13, 2009
Buffett & Gates
Here's the transcript from the town hall meeting Warren Buffett and Bill Gates held at Columbia University yesterday. An excerpt:
Response to a question on Burlington Northern
...railroads are tied to the future prosperity of this country. You can't move a railroad to China or India or anyplace else. We start out with the premise, and I can't think of a more sound premise, that there will be more people in this country, 10, 20, 30 years from now. They will be moving more and more goods back and forth to each other. And you have the most environmentally friendly and the most cost-efficient way of doing that on the railroads. The Burlington Northern last year moved -- on average it moved a ton of freight, 470 miles on one gallon of diesel. That is far, far more efficient than what takes place over the highways. You have the situation where overall they use 1/3 less fuel, they put far fewer pollutants into the atmosphere than trucks will. So the rails are in tune with the future. - Warren Buffett
The meeting aired last night on CNBC.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Response to a question on Burlington Northern
...railroads are tied to the future prosperity of this country. You can't move a railroad to China or India or anyplace else. We start out with the premise, and I can't think of a more sound premise, that there will be more people in this country, 10, 20, 30 years from now. They will be moving more and more goods back and forth to each other. And you have the most environmentally friendly and the most cost-efficient way of doing that on the railroads. The Burlington Northern last year moved -- on average it moved a ton of freight, 470 miles on one gallon of diesel. That is far, far more efficient than what takes place over the highways. You have the situation where overall they use 1/3 less fuel, they put far fewer pollutants into the atmosphere than trucks will. So the rails are in tune with the future. - Warren Buffett
The meeting aired last night on CNBC.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Buffett on Aesop's Formula for Value
Back in February students from business schools were invited to come visit Warren Buffett for a Q&A session.
Here are some excerpts from notes taken during the visit including, among other things, a formula for value that goes back to 600 BC:
Buffett:
When I do invest, I don't care if the stock price goes from $10 to $2 but I do care about if the value went from $10 to $2. Avoid debt. I decided early on that I never wanted to owe more than 25% of my net worth, and I haven't…
Well, at least not since the early days. Buffett prefers to always be in a strong position and too much debt can get in the way of that.
Buffett:
The formula for value was handed down from 600 BC by a guy named Aesop. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Investing is about laying out a bird now to get two or more out of the bush. The keys are to only look at the bushes you like and identify how long it will take to get them out. When interest rates are 20%, you need to get it out right now. When rates are 1%, you have 10 years. Think about what the asset will produce. Look at the asset, not the beta. I don't really care about volatility. Stock price is not that important to me, it just gives you the opportunity to buy at a great price. I don't care if they close the NYSE for 5 years. I care more about the business than I do about events. I care about if there's price flexibility and whether the company can gain more market share. I care about people drinking more Coke.
I bought a farm from the FDIC 20 years ago for $600 per acre. Now I don't know anything about farming but my son does. I asked him, how much it cost to buy corn, plow the field, harvest, how much an acre will yield, what price to expect. I haven't gotten a quote on that farm in 20 years.
Check out the notes in their entirety.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Here are some excerpts from notes taken during the visit including, among other things, a formula for value that goes back to 600 BC:
Buffett:
When I do invest, I don't care if the stock price goes from $10 to $2 but I do care about if the value went from $10 to $2. Avoid debt. I decided early on that I never wanted to owe more than 25% of my net worth, and I haven't…
Well, at least not since the early days. Buffett prefers to always be in a strong position and too much debt can get in the way of that.
Buffett:
The formula for value was handed down from 600 BC by a guy named Aesop. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Investing is about laying out a bird now to get two or more out of the bush. The keys are to only look at the bushes you like and identify how long it will take to get them out. When interest rates are 20%, you need to get it out right now. When rates are 1%, you have 10 years. Think about what the asset will produce. Look at the asset, not the beta. I don't really care about volatility. Stock price is not that important to me, it just gives you the opportunity to buy at a great price. I don't care if they close the NYSE for 5 years. I care more about the business than I do about events. I care about if there's price flexibility and whether the company can gain more market share. I care about people drinking more Coke.
I bought a farm from the FDIC 20 years ago for $600 per acre. Now I don't know anything about farming but my son does. I asked him, how much it cost to buy corn, plow the field, harvest, how much an acre will yield, what price to expect. I haven't gotten a quote on that farm in 20 years.
Check out the notes in their entirety.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Why Buffett's Not a Big Fan of Gold
Warren Buffett said this about investments in gold during an interview with Becky Quick on CNBC in March:
"I have no views as to where it will be, but the one thing I can tell you is it won't do anything between now and then except look at you. Whereas, you know, Coca-Cola will be making money, and I think Wells Fargo will be making a lot of money and there will be a lot–and it's a lot–it's a lot better to have a goose that keeps laying eggs than a goose that just sits there and eats insurance and storage and a few things like that. The idea of digging something up out of the ground, you know, in South Africa or someplace and then transporting it to the United States and putting into the ground, you know, in the Federal Reserve of New York, does not strike me as a terrific asset."
In the long run, a productive asset like a good business (or shares of) is likely to create more value over time than a non-productive asset like a chunk of yellow metal.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything
"I have no views as to where it will be, but the one thing I can tell you is it won't do anything between now and then except look at you. Whereas, you know, Coca-Cola will be making money, and I think Wells Fargo will be making a lot of money and there will be a lot–and it's a lot–it's a lot better to have a goose that keeps laying eggs than a goose that just sits there and eats insurance and storage and a few things like that. The idea of digging something up out of the ground, you know, in South Africa or someplace and then transporting it to the United States and putting into the ground, you know, in the Federal Reserve of New York, does not strike me as a terrific asset."
In the long run, a productive asset like a good business (or shares of) is likely to create more value over time than a non-productive asset like a chunk of yellow metal.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
Miscellaneous Munger Quotes
"I don't have too much interest in teaching other people how to get rich. And that isn't because I fear the competition or anything like that — Warren has always been very open about what he's learned, and I share that ethos. My personal behavior model is Lord Keynes: I wanted to get rich so I could be independent, and so I could do other things like give talks on the intersection of psychology and economics. I didn't want to turn it into a total obsession." - Charlie Munger
"We only want what success we can get despite encouraging others to share our general views about reality." - Charlie Munger
"For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits." - Charlie Munger
"When technology moves as fast as it does in a civilization like ours, you get a phenomenon which I call competitive destruction. You know, you have the finest buggy whip factory and all of a sudden in comes this little horseless carriage. And before too many years go by, your buggy whip business is dead. You either get into a different business or you're dead—you're destroyed. It happens again and again and again. And when these new businesses come in, there are huge advantages for the early birds. And when you’re an early bird, there's a model that I call 'surfing'—when a surfer gets up and catches the wave and just stays there, he can go a long, long time. But if he gets off the wave, he becomes mired in shallows..." - Charlie Munger
"...there are all kinds of wonderful new inventions that give you nothing as owners except the opportunity to spend a lot more money in a business that's still going to be lousy. The money still won't come to you. All of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers." - Charlie Munger
"We only want what success we can get despite encouraging others to share our general views about reality." - Charlie Munger
"For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits." - Charlie Munger
"When technology moves as fast as it does in a civilization like ours, you get a phenomenon which I call competitive destruction. You know, you have the finest buggy whip factory and all of a sudden in comes this little horseless carriage. And before too many years go by, your buggy whip business is dead. You either get into a different business or you're dead—you're destroyed. It happens again and again and again. And when these new businesses come in, there are huge advantages for the early birds. And when you’re an early bird, there's a model that I call 'surfing'—when a surfer gets up and catches the wave and just stays there, he can go a long, long time. But if he gets off the wave, he becomes mired in shallows..." - Charlie Munger
"...there are all kinds of wonderful new inventions that give you nothing as owners except the opportunity to spend a lot more money in a business that's still going to be lousy. The money still won't come to you. All of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers." - Charlie Munger
Friday, November 6, 2009
The Way of the Dodo
Some excerpts from Grantham's latest letter:
Nobel
"I can't tell you how surprised, even embarrassed I was to get the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Yes, I had passed the dreaded chemistry A-level for 18-year-olds back in England in 1958. But did they realize it was my third attempt? And, yes, I will take this honor as encouragement to do some serious thinking on the topic. I will also invest the award to help save the planet. Perhaps that was really the Nobel Committee's sneaky motive, since there are regrettably no green awards yet. Still, all in all, it didn't seem deserved." - Jeremy Grantham from the 3Q09 Letter
Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets
"Rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis are as dead as dodos, yet their baleful and painful influence lives on...
...[investment] committee members by and large buy into the idea that portfolio composition should not change and should be fixed as closely as possible to the policy benchmark, which certainly would make sense in that parallel universe where markets really are efficiently priced. This means that you cheerfully own just as much equity in 2000 at 35 times earnings as you did in 1982 at 6 times. This is not a good idea unless you derive enormous personal utility from a display of discipline, perhaps better viewed as inflexibility in this case." - Jeremy Grantham from the 3Q09 Letter
Check out the letter in its entirety.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Nobel
"I can't tell you how surprised, even embarrassed I was to get the Nobel Prize in chemistry. Yes, I had passed the dreaded chemistry A-level for 18-year-olds back in England in 1958. But did they realize it was my third attempt? And, yes, I will take this honor as encouragement to do some serious thinking on the topic. I will also invest the award to help save the planet. Perhaps that was really the Nobel Committee's sneaky motive, since there are regrettably no green awards yet. Still, all in all, it didn't seem deserved." - Jeremy Grantham from the 3Q09 Letter
Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets
"Rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis are as dead as dodos, yet their baleful and painful influence lives on...
...[investment] committee members by and large buy into the idea that portfolio composition should not change and should be fixed as closely as possible to the policy benchmark, which certainly would make sense in that parallel universe where markets really are efficiently priced. This means that you cheerfully own just as much equity in 2000 at 35 times earnings as you did in 1982 at 6 times. This is not a good idea unless you derive enormous personal utility from a display of discipline, perhaps better viewed as inflexibility in this case." - Jeremy Grantham from the 3Q09 Letter
Check out the letter in its entirety.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Warren Buffett on Consumer Franchises: Berkshire Shareholder Letter Highlights
From Buffett's 1983 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) shareholder letter:
In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.
Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price.
The line "pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences" is the foundation of an economic moat. The moats of great consumer franchises reside between the ears of their customers. If someone is loyal to a particular beverage because of the taste, for example, they are probably not going to sweat paying 40 cents versus 25 cents (a 60% higher price) for some generic alternative.
On the other hand, if you are some buyer of computer chips for Raytheon, or whatever, you will sweat bullets over a 60% difference in price. This difference in behavior helps explain the reliable premium rates of return for Coca-Cola. The same, give or take, can be said for Wrigley's, Pepsi and other great consumer franchises.
Each are durable wide moat businesses with high returns on capital.
In addition, an established consumer franchise with pricing power (and, as a result, superior returns on capital) can use the extra cash coming in to build stronger distribution and buy more advertising. Over time that stronger distribution and bigger ad budget reinforces the strength the of the brand(s) and widens the moat. It's more generic competition with lower margins can't afford to invest as many $'s in product, distribution, and advertising so over time the gap tends to widen. The interplay of these forces makes most of the larger consumer franchises nearly impossible to displace.
Adam
Long BRKb
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.
Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price.
The line "pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences" is the foundation of an economic moat. The moats of great consumer franchises reside between the ears of their customers. If someone is loyal to a particular beverage because of the taste, for example, they are probably not going to sweat paying 40 cents versus 25 cents (a 60% higher price) for some generic alternative.
On the other hand, if you are some buyer of computer chips for Raytheon, or whatever, you will sweat bullets over a 60% difference in price. This difference in behavior helps explain the reliable premium rates of return for Coca-Cola. The same, give or take, can be said for Wrigley's, Pepsi and other great consumer franchises.
Each are durable wide moat businesses with high returns on capital.
In addition, an established consumer franchise with pricing power (and, as a result, superior returns on capital) can use the extra cash coming in to build stronger distribution and buy more advertising. Over time that stronger distribution and bigger ad budget reinforces the strength the of the brand(s) and widens the moat. It's more generic competition with lower margins can't afford to invest as many $'s in product, distribution, and advertising so over time the gap tends to widen. The interplay of these forces makes most of the larger consumer franchises nearly impossible to displace.
Adam
Long BRKb
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
Long-term Competitive Advantage...
"...in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There's no rule that you have to invest money where you've earned it. Indeed, it's often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can't for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return." - Warren Buffett in the 2007 Shareholder Letter
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
16 Rules
Good recent post on Walter Schloss.
Excerpt:
In the value investing world, Walter Schloss is a legend. He did not attend college and was initially hired at the age of 18 as a runner on Wall Street in 1934. He took investment courses taught by Graham at the New York Stock Exchange Institute. He eventually went to work for Graham in the Graham-Newman Partnership, at about the same time Warren Buffett worked in the firm.
In 1955, Schloss left Graham's company and started up his own investment firm, eventually managing money for 92 investors. By maintaining a manageable asset size, Schloss averaged a 15.3% compound return over the course of five decades, versus 10% for the S&P 500.
Schloss closed out his fund in 2000 and stopped actively managing others' money in 2003.
Warren Buffett named him as one of The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, who disproved the academic position that the market was efficient, and that beating the S&P 500 was "pure chance".
Warren Buffett had this to say about Schloss:
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything
Excerpt:
In the value investing world, Walter Schloss is a legend. He did not attend college and was initially hired at the age of 18 as a runner on Wall Street in 1934. He took investment courses taught by Graham at the New York Stock Exchange Institute. He eventually went to work for Graham in the Graham-Newman Partnership, at about the same time Warren Buffett worked in the firm.
In 1955, Schloss left Graham's company and started up his own investment firm, eventually managing money for 92 investors. By maintaining a manageable asset size, Schloss averaged a 15.3% compound return over the course of five decades, versus 10% for the S&P 500.
Schloss closed out his fund in 2000 and stopped actively managing others' money in 2003.
Warren Buffett named him as one of The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, who disproved the academic position that the market was efficient, and that beating the S&P 500 was "pure chance".
Warren Buffett had this to say about Schloss:
He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner: And that's all he does. He owns many more stocks than I do and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don't seem to have very much influence on Walter. That is one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.Check out his investing rules.
Adam
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything
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