Friday, December 31, 2010

Quotes of 2010

A collection of quotes said or written at some point during this calendar year.

"There are 309 million people out there that are trying to improve their lot in life. And we've got a system that allows them to do it. It doesn't allow things to get changed overnight, though. And-- and-- it's-- it's important to have the right monetary policy. It's important for-- to have the right fiscal policy. But it's nowhere near as important as just the normal regenerative capacity of American capitalism." - Warren Buffett

"Most sports have conceded flaws in their design, and are better off for having addressed them. Tennis added the tiebreaker, football penalties for pass interference, basketball the three-point shot. So why not soccer? Oh, there was one attempt: the penalty shootout. It's like someone said, 'For really important games, let's make the outcome even more random.'" - Richard Bookstaber

"...let's talk about soccer scores. There are a few things that people all around the world need to admit to themselves. Trade restraints slow economic growth, the euro is not a reserve currency and scoreless sports ties are boring." - P.J. O'Rourke

".The purpose of sports—even foreign sports—is not to bore people. Boredom can be so easily obtained. Hunger, exhaustion from making a living and authoritarian governments that ban the fun parts of the Internet provide it free in most of the world." - P.J. O'Rourke

"Nothing But Costs"
"What is Wall Street supposed to do? It's not a creator of wealth. It's a handmaiden to creators of wealth. It occupies an essentially parasitic, but usefully parasitic relationship with the rest of the society. It's totally out of control. It's not making America a great place; it's making America a worse place right now." - Michael Lewis

Markets, Psychology, & the Business Cycle
"...markets have rhythms tied to the interplay of psychology and the business cycle. And while they are only a rough guide for what to expect, what they aren't is irrelevant. Investors forget that it's better to have the problems exposed and absorbed than to be unaware they're there, fuses burning." - Michael Santoli

"The web evolved into a powerful, ubiquitous tool because it was built on egalitarian principles, the web as we know it, however, is being threatened in different ways. Some of its most successful inhabitants have begun to chip away at its principles." - World Wide Web Founder Tim Berners-Lee

"The more you enter, the more you become locked in. Your social-networking site becomes a central platform - a closed silo of content, and one that does not give you full control over your information in it. The more this kind of architecture gains widespread use, the more the Web becomes fragmented, and the less we enjoy a single, universal information space." - Tim Berners-Lee

"...I'm skeptical about the narrowness of the business school curriculum. I happen to believe it should have a much greater liberal arts emphasis, and even a much greater emphasis on the classics. The Odyssey will tell you an awful lot about human nature and life, and therefore about business, and societal values. Read the Odyssey. Read Dante's Inferno. You can also learn a lot by reading Seneca's essay on the shortness of life or Montaigne's essay on vanity." - John Bogle

"Somebody ought to spend a little time thinking...and this gets back to the classics, about the role of business in society. It should add value. But the financial business does not add value. By definition the financial business subtracts value. In round numbers, it takes something like $600 billion out of the pockets of investors every year. That’s $6 trillion dollars in 10 years." - John Bogle

Senator Johanns: "It kinda reminds me what the chief of staff said: 'never let a good crisis go to waste.' And what we are doing here is we're taking this financial reform and we're expanding it beyond where we should be. And I just question the wisdom of that unless somebody can make the case to me that had this been in place the world would be different."

Paul Volcker: "The problem today is to look ahead, and try to anticipate the problems that may arise that will give rise to the next crisis. And I tell you, sure as I am sitting here, that if banking institutions are protected by the taxpayer and they are given free rein to speculate, I may not live long enough to see the crisis, but my soul is going to come back and haunt you."

"What got us into this mess was raw speculation and its offspring, a sustained misallocation of capital." - Michael Lewitt

"I think we have been distracted a lot by people who bleeded about their own things. I'm not sure somebody as technologically ignorant as Al Gore is entitled to speak on the subject. I think you should have punched your ticket in a few better places before you open your mouth." - Charlie Munger speaking on the building of an alternative energy infrastructure

"Idiots and knaves were making a fortune selling shoddy mortgages with ridiculous theories. It was very regrettable behavior. And it was the easy money that allowed it and, of course, the adults who could have fixed it like the accountants who had ridiculous standards without which the bad behavior wouldn't have worked.

The accountants utterly failed us. And, by the way, there is practically no sign of any intelligent reversal of the failure of that profession. I have yet to meet many accountants who are the least bit ashamed for their contribution to our recent troubles but it was immense." - Charlie Munger

"Our system is to swim as competently as we can and sometimes the tide will be with us and sometimes it will be against us. But by and large we don't much bother with trying to predict the tides because we plan to play the game for a long time.

I recommend to all of you exactly the same attitude.

It's kind of a snare and a delusion to outguess macroeconomic cycles...very few people do it successfully and some of them do it by accident. When the game is that tough, why not adopt the other system of swimming as competently as you can and figuring that over a long life you'll have your share of good tides and bad tides?" - Charlie Munger

"...the 3% of GDP that was made up of financial services in 1965 was clearly sufficient to the task, the proof being that the decade was a strong candidate for the greatest economic decade of the 20th century. We should be suspicious, therefore, of the benefits derived from the extra 4.5% of the pie that went to pay for financial services by 2007, as the financial services share of GDP expanded to a remarkable 7.5%. This extra 4.5% would seem to be without material value except to the recipients. Yet it is a form of tax on the remaining real economy and should reduce by 4.5% a year its ability to save and invest, both of which did slow down. This, in turn, should eventually reduce the growth rate of the non-financial sector, which it indeed did: from 3.5% a year before 1965, this growth rate slowed to 2.4% between 1980 and 2007, even before the crisis." - Jeremy Grantham

"I hate gold. It does not pay a dividend, it has no value, and you can't work out what it should or shouldn't be worth," he said. "It is the last refuge of the desperate." - Jeremy Grantham

"Everyone asks about gold. This is the irony: just as Jim Grant tells us (correctly) that we all have faith-based paper currencies backed by nothing, it is equally fair to say that gold is a faith-based metal. It pays no dividend, cannot be eaten, and is mostly used for nothing more useful than jewelry. I would say that anything of which 75% sits idly and expensively in bank vaults is, as a measure of value, only one step up from the Polynesian islands that attached value to certain well-known large rocks that were traded." - Jeremy Grantham

"You don't actually find a strong correlation between— top-line GDP growth and making money in the market. It— it seems like you should. The fastest-growing countries should give you the highest return. They simply don't. But, there's only four of us— that— that believe that story. Everyone else in the world believes that if you grow fast like China, you'll outperform in the stock market." - Jeremy Grantham

"...how little our side of the industry did to move its business to the more ethical firms and to make a fuss about conflicted or unethical behavior. Had a number of us moved our business, we might have slowed or even stopped the 30-year slide in conflicted, unethical behavior that we have experienced. I, for one, regret the modest nature of our moves. We all could have done more. We have tolerated a pretty nasty decline in standards. Shame on us." - Jeremy Grantham

"You could take all the gold that's ever been mined, and it would fill a cube 67 feet in each direction. For what that's worth at current gold prices, you could buy all -- not some -- all of the farmland in the United States. Plus, you could buy 10 Exxon Mobils, plus have $1 trillion of walking-around money. Or you could have a big cube of metal. Which would you take? Which is going to produce more value?" - Warren Buffett

"It's quite clear that stocks are cheaper than bonds. I can't imagine anybody having bonds in their portfolio when they can own equities, a diversified group of equities. But people do because they, the lack of confidence. But that's what makes for the attractive prices. If they had their confidence back, they wouldn't be selling at these prices. And believe me, it will come back over time." - Warren Buffett

Happy New Year,

Adam

Quotes of 2009

This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Thursday, December 30, 2010

Charlie Munger on LTCM & Overconfidence

From a speech by Charlie Munger to the Foundation Financial Officers Group more than a decade ago just after the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM):

"...you may think, my foundation, at least, will be above average. It is well endowed, hires the best, and considers all investment issues at length and with objective professionalism. And to this I respond that an excess of what seems like professionalism will often hurt you horribly — precisely because the careful procedures themselves often lead to overconfidence in their outcome.

General Motors recently made just such a mistake, and it was a lollapalooza. Using fancy consumer surveys, its excess of professionalism, it concluded not to put a fourth door in a truck designed to serve also as the equivalent of a comfortable five-passenger car. Its competitors, more basic, had actually seen five people enter and exit cars. Moreover they had noticed that people were used to four doors in a comfortable five-passenger car and that biological creatures ordinarily prefer effort minimization in routine activies and don’t like removals of long-enjoyed benefits."

 A costly mistake for GM, but nothing compared to LTCM. Munger goes on to say the following:

"Similarly, the hedge fund known as 'Long-Term Capital Management' recently collapsed, through overconfidence in its highly leveraged methods, despite I.Q's of its principals that must have averaged 160. Smart, hard-working people aren't exempted from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just go aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods."

After a few years of great returns, I'm sure investors in LTCM were feeling pretty good while not understand the risks being taken and the cliff their money was about to fall off. The fund lasted all of four plus years before it collapsed so it's hard not to chuckle at the name they chose: Long-Term Capital Management.

The value of $1,000 invested in LTCM, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and invested monthly in U.S. Treasuries at constant maturity.

Deciding to use "Long-Term" in the name of a highly leveraged*, speculative, $ 100 billion fund that used complex mathematical models in what ended up being a failed attempt to profit from fixed income arbitrage is pretty awesome.

Adam

Munger's speech to the Foundation Financial Officers Group - 1998

Related posts:
"Nothing But Costs"
When Genius Failed...Again
Smart Money?
The Madness of Crowds
Max Planck: Resistance of the Human Mind

* Prior to the collapse LTCM had ~ $ 400 million of capital. With more than $ 100 billion of assets that meant the leverage ratio was ~250 to 1. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a bailout to avoid a wider collapse in the financial markets. The partners had $1.9 billion of their own money invested in LTCM. They lost all of it.
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This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Buffett on Stock Buybacks - Part II: Berkshire Shareholder Letter Highlights

As a follow up to this post on stock buybacks. Here's a more complete explanation by Warren Buffett of his views on buying back stock.

From the 1984 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) shareholder letter:

"The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurchases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons - one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.

The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company's market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management's domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer."

Buffett later added...

"The key word is 'demonstrated'. A manager who consistently turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths some public relations-inspired phrase such as 'maximizing shareholder wealth' (this season's favorite), the market correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not listening to his mouth - and, after a while, neither will the market."

Even though written more than 25 years ago we've no doubt this past decade seen more than our fair share of shareholder wealth destroying, as Buffett says, "actions that expand management's domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders."

We've also seen many stock buybacks happen when a company's stock price was clearly above intrinsic value. In fact, if you look at a chart of S&P 500 stock repurchases over the past five years you'll notice most of the buying was being done when the market peaked* in 2007. Evidence of management competence in this regard among public companies is rather spotty to say the least. While this type of mistake may not be caused by a "self-interested manager marching to a different drummer", it is a mistake in judgment that can be just as destructive to shareholder wealth. The quantity of purchases and amount that the stock sells above intrinsic value when those repurchases occur obviously determines the extent of the damage that is done.

From an investors perspective the best type of manager: 1) understands the stock price/intrinsic value relationship, 2) consistently displays good judgment in the use of excess capital for dividends/share repurchases/acquisitions, and 3) does not pursue expansion of management's domain or growth for growth's sake (at shareholders expense) under the guise of "strategic opportunity" or some similar phrase.

Adam

Long BRKb

Related posts:
Buffett on Stock Buybacks
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?

* Buyback activity was also at or near the lowest levels when the market bottomed in 2009.
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This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Tuesday, December 28, 2010

iPad Rivals: "Not Ready for Prime Time"

An article on how the iPad is doing against its competitors:

...analyst Brian Blair said recent retail checks point to significant end demand for the iPad.

"Even with a handful of tablet competitors hitting the market, the iPad remained the only game in town in our holiday checks largely because many of the tablets hitting the market are junk for lack of a better word," he wrote. "They are underpowered, poorly constructed and largely not ready for prime time."

Not exactly a surprise. Looks like Apple (AAPL) will have yet another impressive holiday season.

Adam

Long AAPL

This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and are never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Monday, December 27, 2010

Ending the Cisco Skid

A new article in Barron's written by Michael Santoli on Cisco's (CSCO) future prospects. It makes the following points:

- When the Nasdaq peaked a decade or so ago, Cisco was selling at 130 times earnings, a huge premium.

- The company was being given too much credit for growth prospects.

The company's earnings multiple is a fraction of what it was back then (more like 12x). From the article:

Investors, making the opposite error they made in 2000, have priced in too much skepticism about Cisco's growth prospects and market-share position, making the stock an attractive opportunity for patient buyers.

Check out the entire article.

Cisco is just one of many tech stocks that a mere decade or so ago sold for an extreme multiple of earnings.

In the past ten years or so, many large cap tech stocks have seen their price to earnings ratio compress dramatically even as the businesses themselves have continued to prosper.

Adam

Long position in CSCO

This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Buffett on Stock Buybacks: Berkshire Shareholder Letter Highlights

Warren Buffett wrote the following in the 1984 Berkshire Hathaway (BRKashareholder letter:

"When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases."

If a company's own stock is selling at a discount to a conservative estimate of value, buying back stock is a very low risk way to enrich remaining shareholders.

Other shareholder enhancing moves mostly involve more risk.

Having said that, here's one situation to think about that sometimes gets too little consideration.

Unfortunately, it's possible that a buyout offer comes in at a nice premium to market value but a discount to intrinsic value. If enough owners are okay with the gain that will have occurred compared to the recent price action, the deal may be approved. The quality of a company's board of directors naturally comes into play in such a scenario. If too few have conviction about longer run prospects, the deal may get approved. When too many owners of shares are in it for the short-term or, at least, primarily to profit from price action, the chance of this happening increases.

Well, those that became owners because of the plain discount to intrinsic value and the company's long run prospects will likely get hurt in this scenario.

Adam

Long BRKb

Related post:
Buy a Stock...Hope the Price Drops?
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This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Friday, December 24, 2010

Buffett on Short Selling

"You'll see way more stocks that are dramatically overvalued than dramatically undervalued. It's common for promoters to cause a stock to become valued at 5-10 times its true value, but rare to find a stock trading at 10-20% of its true value. So you might think short selling is easy, but it's not. Often stocks are overvalued because there is a promoter or a crook behind it. They can often bootstrap into value by using the shares of their overvalued stock. For example, it it's worth $10 and is trading at $100, they might be able to build value to $50. Then, Wall Street says, "Hey! Look at all that value creation!" and the game goes on. [As a short seller,] you could run out of money before the promoter runs out of ideas."

"Everything we've ever thought about shorting worked out eventually, but it's very painful. It's a whole lot easier to make money on the long side. You can't make big money shorting because the risk of big losses means you can't make big bets." - Warren Buffett

Notes from the 2001 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting

Buffett on Acquisitions

"...managers need to know how to value a business to think sensibly about acquisitions. Since they don't, they rely on Wall Street, which of course recommends doing deals because they get paid X if the deal doesn't go through and 20X is the deal does." - Warren Buffett

Notes from the 2001 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting

Thursday, December 23, 2010

Munger on Black-Scholes

"Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value - only price - then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it's crazy to get into Black-Scholes. For example, at Costco we issued stock options with strike prices of $30 and $60, and Black-Scholes valued the $60 ones higher. This is insane." - Charlie Munger

More From Nassim Taleb

According to this recent CNBC article, Nassim Taleb thinks it makes no sense to be against big government but for big business.

He calls this "inconsistent and corrupt".  

From the article:

"They're both very bad, particularly big government. Big government ends up like socialist states," he said. "They end up favoring large corporations that have a lot of employees. That kills growth from small companies who cannot get to Washington, they cannot get lobbyists."

"The problem I have is that Republicans love big business and Democrats love big government, and I hate both big business and big government," he added.

Back in October he also had the following to say in this Bloomberg article:

...investors who lost money in the financial crisis should sue the Swedish Central Bank for awarding the Nobel Prize to economists whose theories he said brought down the global economy.

"I want to make the Nobel accountable," Taleb said today in an interview in London. "Citizens should sue if they lost their job or business owing to the breakdown in the financial system."

He also added the following about the 1990 Nobel award to Harry Markowitz, Merton Miller, and William Sharpe for work on portfolio theory and asset-pricing models. 

"I'm not blaming them for coming up with the idea, but I'm blaming the Nobel for giving them legitimacy. No one would have taken Markowitz seriously without the Nobel stamp."

Taleb thinks the models are built to substantially underestimate risks.

...and finally had this to say.

"If no one else sues them, I will," said Taleb, who declined to say where or on what basis a lawsuit could be brought.

Here's some other thoughts from Taleb over the past year or so:



I'm certainly no fan of those flawed theories. More importantly, my hope is for Taleb to continue offering his opinions, and making similar assertions, if for no other reason than the entertainment value.

Adam

This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.