Here's what Jeff Bezos had to say in the latest Amazon (AMZN) shareholder letter:
"This year, Amazon became the fastest company ever to reach $100 billion in annual sales. Also this year, Amazon Web Services is reaching $10 billion in annual sales … doing so at a pace even faster than Amazon achieved that milestone.
What's going on here? Both were planted as tiny seeds and both have grown organically without significant acquisitions into meaningful and large businesses, quickly. Superficially, the two could hardly be more different. One serves consumers and the other serves enterprises. One is famous for brown boxes and the other for APIs. Is it only a coincidence that two such dissimilar offerings grew so quickly under one roof? Luck plays an outsized role in every endeavor, and I can assure you we've had a bountiful supply. But beyond that, there is a connection between these two businesses. Under the surface, the two are not so different after all. They share a distinctive organizational culture that cares deeply about and acts with conviction on a small number of principles. I'm talking about customer obsession rather than competitor obsession, eagerness to invent and pioneer, willingness to fail, the patience to think long-term, and the taking of professional pride in operational excellence. Through that lens, AWS and Amazon retail are very similar indeed.
A word about corporate cultures: for better or for worse, they are enduring, stable, hard to change. They can be a source of advantage or disadvantage. You can write down your corporate culture, but when you do so, you're discovering it, uncovering it – not creating it. It is created slowly over time by the people and by events – by the stories of past success and failure that become a deep part of the company lore. If it's a distinctive culture, it will fit certain people like a custom-made glove. The reason cultures are so stable in time is because people self-select. Someone energized by competitive zeal may select and be happy in one culture, while someone who loves to pioneer and invent may choose another. The world, thankfully, is full of many high-performing, highly distinctive corporate cultures. We never claim that our approach is the right one – just that it's ours – and over the last two decades, we've collected a large group of like-minded people. Folks who find our approach energizing and meaningful.
One area where I think we are especially distinctive is failure. I believe we are the best place in the world to fail (we have plenty of practice!), and failure and invention are inseparable twins. To invent you have to experiment, and if you know in advance that it's going to work, it's not an experiment. Most large organizations embrace the idea of invention, but are not willing to suffer the string of failed experiments necessary to get there."
One of the more challenging aspects of investing is judging the value of qualitative factors. When the focus is only on the quantitative some of the most significant elements of intrinsic value can be missed.
It's worth noting that qualitative factors do not necessarily only materially add to value; they can and often do subtract in a big way.
Adam
No position in AMZN
Related posts:
Buffett and Munger Talk Retail Businesses, NFM, and Amazon
Washington Post Sold To Jeff Bezos
Amazon, Apple, and Intrinsic Value - Part II
Amazon, Apple, and Intrinsic Value
Negative Working-Capital Cycle
Amazon, Apple, and Margin of Safety
Amazing Amazon
Barron's on Bezos: Time to Reign in Amazon's CEO?
Amazon's Jeff Bezos On Inventing & Disrupting
Amazon Sells Kindle Fire Below Cost
Technology Stocks
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
Friday, April 1, 2016
Flying Too Close To The Sun
Warren Buffett, in last year's Berkshire Hathaway (BRKa) special letter*, explained that conglomerates have been at times very popular but became especially so back in the 1960s:
"Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s."
This was covered, to an extent, in a post from late last year.
LTV -- a company once run by Jimmy Ling during that era -- is used as an example of a conglomerate structure that goes very wrong. From the letter:
"Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
Ling's strategy...was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: 'Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.' The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling's empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, fired.
Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have 'worked.' Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices."
So a bit of healthy skepticism comes in handy when some repackaged business strategy is being promoted aggressively (especially when bankers and the press fan the flames). This is especially true when questionable accounting and aggressive financing comes into play.
CEO behavior can have a huge impact on intrinsic business value especially over the very long haul. The good news is that plenty of extremely capable business executives are out there. Unfortunately, personality and salesmanship sometimes get in the way of making a sound judgment about a CEOs overall talents. For investors, it's vital to I.D. situations beforehand that lead to inflated perceived prospects and, at least for a time, a valuation that reflects the flawed perception.
The specifics may vary but it almost always is wise to avoid of investing in -- or, at times, alongside -- those who tend to overestimate themselves no matter how smart someone is (or seems to be).
"Smart, hard-working people aren't exempted from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just go aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods." - Charlie Munger speech to the Foundation Financial Officers Group
"We recognized early on that very smart people do very dumb things, and we wanted to know why and who, so we could avoid them." - Charlie Munger at the 2007 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
"If you think your IQ is 160 but it's 150, you're a disaster. It's much better to have a 130 IQ and think it's 120." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
"If you have a 150 IQ, sell 30 points to someone else. You need to be smart, but not a genius. What's most important is inner peace; you have to be able to think for yourself. It's not a complicated game." - Warren Buffett at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
Humility and knowing what you don't know can go a long way in investing.
Adam
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent market prices
Related posts:
Berkshire's Structure: Why It Works
Corporate Hocus-Pocus
Charlie Munger: Focus Investing and Fuzzy Concepts
Grantham & Buffett: "Career Risk" & "The Institutional Imperative"
Buffett on "The Institutional Imperative"
Buffett: A Portrait of Business Discipline
Buffett on Bold & Imaginative Accounting
Charlie Munger on LTCM & Overconfidence
When Genius Failed...Again
* This is Buffett's special letter that was written for the 50th Anniversary of Berkshire. Munger also wrote a separate letter to recognize this Golden Anniversary. These can also be found at the end of the regular letter (page 24 and 39 respectively).
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.
"Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s."
This was covered, to an extent, in a post from late last year.
LTV -- a company once run by Jimmy Ling during that era -- is used as an example of a conglomerate structure that goes very wrong. From the letter:
"Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
Ling's strategy...was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: 'Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.' The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling's empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, fired.
Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have 'worked.' Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices."
So a bit of healthy skepticism comes in handy when some repackaged business strategy is being promoted aggressively (especially when bankers and the press fan the flames). This is especially true when questionable accounting and aggressive financing comes into play.
CEO behavior can have a huge impact on intrinsic business value especially over the very long haul. The good news is that plenty of extremely capable business executives are out there. Unfortunately, personality and salesmanship sometimes get in the way of making a sound judgment about a CEOs overall talents. For investors, it's vital to I.D. situations beforehand that lead to inflated perceived prospects and, at least for a time, a valuation that reflects the flawed perception.
The specifics may vary but it almost always is wise to avoid of investing in -- or, at times, alongside -- those who tend to overestimate themselves no matter how smart someone is (or seems to be).
"Smart, hard-working people aren't exempted from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just go aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods." - Charlie Munger speech to the Foundation Financial Officers Group
"We recognized early on that very smart people do very dumb things, and we wanted to know why and who, so we could avoid them." - Charlie Munger at the 2007 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
"If you think your IQ is 160 but it's 150, you're a disaster. It's much better to have a 130 IQ and think it's 120." - Charlie Munger at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
"If you have a 150 IQ, sell 30 points to someone else. You need to be smart, but not a genius. What's most important is inner peace; you have to be able to think for yourself. It's not a complicated game." - Warren Buffett at the 2009 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Meeting
Humility and knowing what you don't know can go a long way in investing.
Adam
Long position in BRKb established at much lower than recent market prices
Related posts:
Berkshire's Structure: Why It Works
Corporate Hocus-Pocus
Charlie Munger: Focus Investing and Fuzzy Concepts
Grantham & Buffett: "Career Risk" & "The Institutional Imperative"
Buffett on "The Institutional Imperative"
Buffett: A Portrait of Business Discipline
Buffett on Bold & Imaginative Accounting
Charlie Munger on LTCM & Overconfidence
When Genius Failed...Again
* This is Buffett's special letter that was written for the 50th Anniversary of Berkshire. Munger also wrote a separate letter to recognize this Golden Anniversary. These can also be found at the end of the regular letter (page 24 and 39 respectively).
---
This site does not provide investing recommendations as that comes down to individual circumstances. Instead, it is for generalized informational, educational, and entertainment purposes. Visitors should always do their own research and consult, as needed, with a financial adviser that's familiar with the individual circumstances before making any investment decisions. Bottom line: The opinions found here should never be considered specific individualized investment advice and never a recommendation to buy or sell anything.